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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
This five part critical discourse examines in part the 
story of a personal odyssey and is therefore partly 
confessional. The odyssey, which comprises the first part 
of the narrative approach, relates to the journey I have 
taken to try to understand the development of the mind and 
the forms through which its contents are made public. 
The second part relates to the literature review, how 
my ideas about these matters evolved. This review will 
begin by examining the classic theories in psychology; 
specifically, Vygotsky, Piaget, Bronfenbrenner, Rogoff, 
Dewey, etc. 
The third part is a critique of critical thinking and 
critical pedagogy and refers to the dilemmas, uncertainties, 
and conundrums that the ideas I embrace have caused me. 
The fourth part relates to the role of transformative 
knowledge in multicultural education. I hope to make a 
positive contribution to this critical discourse in the 
field of educational psychology and to examine how those 
philosophical ideas in the field of knowledge have helped in 
transforming my academic knowledge into multicultural 
education. 
The fifth part relates to the general principle~ 
applying to classroom methodology. I will explore what 
these ideas might mean for the future of educational 
psychology, both how it is pursued and how it is presented. 
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In conclusion I will deal with the implications; that 
is, I will present the case that transformation knowledge is 
necessary in multicultural education. 
This review will begin by examining the classic 
theories in psychology; specifically, Vygotsky, Gibson, 
Bronfenbrenner, Piaget, and Rogoff. As an introduction to 
transformative knowledge, the knowledge base established by 
the critical pedagogists will be reviewed, for example Paulo 
Freire and Henry A. Giroux. Definitions of transformative 
knowledge and multicultural education will be developed as 
well as the meaning of their integration. 
This discussion is, by necessity, personal. It draws 
on the assumptions of postmodern psychology and builds on 
the conclusion that "what it means to interpret and what it 
means to experience become highly relative, contextual 
concepts" (Josselson & Lieblich, 1995, p. ix). As Geertz 
(1983) recommended, we must orient ourselves to "local 
knowledges," aspects of human experience that are 
individualized and contextualized, rather than continuing in 
the futile search of describing a universalized orderly 
human social world. Following in the tradition of the 
narrative investigation of human life (Josselson & Lieblich, 
1995), I use my own story as a mechanism for beginning the 
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interpretation of experience. Some readers may share a 
concern described by Josselson (1995) : II . within 
psychology, the question to treat people's lived experiences 
embarrasses our more technical understandings of 
intellectual conceptualizations" (p. 32). However, building 
on Bruner's (1986) "narrative modes of knowing," my approach 
follows from Josselson's (1995) conclusion: 
Meaning is generated by the linkages the participant 
makes between aspects of her or his life as lived and 
by the explicit linkages the researcher makes between 
this understanding and interpretation, which is meaning 
constructed at another level of analysis (p. 32). 
In traditional research, when people are aggregated as 
subjects and diversity is treated as error variance as the 
researcher searches for what is common to all, the findings 
reported may teach us about no one in particular. The 
narrative autobiography allows the reader to identify both 
the common and the unique experience with the individual in 
his or her own complexity. 
After finishing my secondary school at Saint Peter 
Claver Seminary Okpala in Nigeria in 1971, I proceeded to 
Bigard Memorial Seminary where I majored in Philosophy and 
Theology. Philosophy for me was exciting and intriguing 
because it always challenged my thinking and became a 
journey into the unknown (Dewey, 1910). The focus is less 
on problems and more on the possibilities inherent in a 
given situation. That journey into the unknown led me to 
pursue the concept of knowledge and how it transforms and 
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develops us in our various cultures. In all my studies in 
philosophy and psychology the puzzle of ideas (the mind) has 
fascinated me. When I look back on our ancestors in this 
field they were also concerned about the issue of whether 
ideas are innate or acquired through the experience of the 
senses. Plato (427-347 BC) believed that ideas are innate 
because the soul, which exists before birth in the realm of 
ideas, is trapped by the body at birth. Medieval Christian 
Philosophers proclaimed the innate depravity of man, and 
later the French Philosopher Rousseau (1712) proclaimed 
innate goodness. Descartes (1596) believed certain ideas 
are innate while the British empiricist Locke (1632) argued 
that the newborn's mind is a blank slate (tabula rasa) on 
which experience writes. These speculations made me become 
more intrigued about the journey into the unknown in quest 
of knowledge and how it transforms humankind. 
It was my interest in children and my need to clarify 
my vague convictions about educational potential in the 
human mind (the ideas) that led me first to DePaul 
University and later into Loyola University both in Chicago 
and to an initiation into the Social Sciences. The programs 
in Education at DePaul and Loyola were intellectually open, 
and I was given enough leeway not only to sustain, but to 
pursue, my interest in my inquiry into the issue of ideas in 
Educational Psychology. I found support in the work of John 
Dewey, Vygotsky, Gibson, Paulo Freire, Ira Shor, 
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Bronfenbrenner, Piaget, Rogoff, Bruner, Richard S. Prawat, 
Elliot W. Eisner, James A. Banks, Margaret Buchmann and 
Robert E. Floden, Roderick M. Chisholm and a host of others 
that are not mentioned here. My encounter with the Social 
Sciences at both universities and my long standing 
involvement in philosophy/theology and psychology, both as a 
priest and a teacher, has forced me to confront the tension 
between my desire to understand and my desire to cultivate 
the problem of the mind in acquisition of knowledge. My 
effort to resolve this tension and my interest in the 
cognitive character of the ideas have been a career-long 
journey. 
This journey has been guided by a variety of beliefs. 
Some of these beliefs came from these quotations: 
The spider carries out operations reminiscent of a 
weaver and the boxes which bees build in the sky could 
disgrace the work of many architects. But even the 
worst architect differs from the most able bee from the 
very outset in that before he builds a box out of 
boards he has already constructed it in his head. At 
the end of the work process he obtains a result which 
already existed in his mind before he began to build. 
The architect not only changes the form given to him by 
nature, within the constraints imposed by nature, he 
also carries out a purpose of his own which defines the 
means and the character of the activity to which he 
must subordinate his will (Karl Marx, Capital 1917). 
It is precisely the alteration of nature by man, not nature 
as such, which is the most essential and immediate basis of 
human thought (Engels, 1940). 
The process in which the architect transforms the form 
given to him by nature, within the constraints imposed by 
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nature, is what is fascinating in human knowledge. This 
transformation can only be achieved through those cultural 
tools given by nature. This theoretical perspective is 
supported by Rogoff (1990) when she stated that the purpose 
of thinking is to act effectively. Activities are goal 
directed (tacitly or explicitly), and such goals carry 
social and cultural definitions and means of handling 
problems. The structure of problems that humans attempt to 
solve, the knowledge base that provides resources, and the 
strategies for solutions that are considered more or less 
effective or sophisticated are situated in a social matrix 
of purposes and values. The problems that are posed, the 
tools that are available to solve them, and the tactics that 
are favored build on the sociocultural definitions and 
available technologies within which an individual functions. 
This tool within which individual functions Bruner (1986) 
pointed out would be that one from Francis Bacon, used by 
Vygotsky, proclaiming that: "Neither the hand nor the mind 
alone would amount to much without aids and tools to perfect 
them. And principal among those aids and tools are language 
and the canons of its use (p. 122). 
This loosely translated quotation is taken from Francis 
Bacon's Novum Organum from which Vygotsky built his theory. 
In this research, I argue that designing aids and tools to 
perfect the mind is one of the primary goals of educational 
transformation. In this view I take the position that all 
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knowledge reflects the values and interests of its creators. 
This knowledge, in my mind, is transformative. With 
reference to Banks (1993), transformative knowledge is not 
neutral but is influenced by human interests, so that all 
knowledge reflects the power and social relationships within 
society. An important purpose of knowledge construction is 
to help people improve society (Code, 1991; Harding, 1991; 
Hooks & West, 1991; King & Mitchell, 1990; Minnich, 1990). 
In the words of Paulo Freire (1995) : 
While all development is transformation, not all 
transformation is development. The transformation 
occurring in a seed which under favorable conditions 
germinates and sprouts, is not development. The 
transformations of seeds and animals are determined by 
the species to which they belong; and they occur in a 
time which does not belong to them, for time belongs to 
humankind (p. 142). 
It is essential for us to understand that experience is the 
bedrock upon which meaning is constructed and that 
experience to a significant degree depends on our ability to 
relate to the qualititative world we inhabit. This 
qualitative world, according to Eisner (1993), is immediate 
before it is mediated, presentational before it is 
representational, sensuous before it is symbolic. This 
"getting in touch," which is crucial for any artist supplies 
the mind with something to think about. Getting in touch is 
itself an act of discrimination, a fine-grained, sensitively 
nuanced selective process in which the mind is fully engaged 
(Eisner, 1993). With Eisner, I believe that the eye is part 
of the mind. 
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Consciousness of the qualitative world as a source of 
potential experience and the human sensory system as a means 
through which those potentialities are explored requires no 
sharp distinction between cognition and perception. On the 
contrary, I came to believe that perception is a cognitive 
event and that construal, not discovery is critical (cf. 
Armheim's 1969 visual thinking and Neisser's 1976 cognition 
and reality). Put in another way, I came to believe that 
humans do not simply have experience, they have a hand in 
its creation, and the quality of their creation depends upon 
the ways they employ their minds. The mind uses these tools 
to transform every perception that comes along its way. 
A second idea that has guided my journey is the belief 
that the use of mind is the most potent means of its 
development. What we think about matters. The language we 
use in carrying out what we think about matters. What we 
try to do with what we think about matters. And so it 
follows, what schools allow children to think about 
influences, in ways perhaps more significant than we 
realize, the kind of minds they come to possess. As the 
English Sociologist Basil Bernstein (1971) suggests, the 
curriculum is a mind-altering device. We might extend his 
observation and say education is a journey into the unknown. 
The assumptions, perspectives, and insights that students 
derive from their experiences in their home and community 
cultures are used as screens to view and interpret the 
knowledge and experiences that they encounter in school and 
in other institutions within the larger society. 
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A third idea that has guided me on this journey, has to 
do with matters of representation. As sensibility is 
refined, our ability to construct meaning within a domain 
increases. The refinement of sensibility is no small 
accomplishment. Hearing, Gilbert Ryle reminds us in the 
Concept of Mind (1949), is an achievement, not simply a 
task. To hear the music, to see the landscape, to feel the 
qualities in a bolt of cloth, are not automatic consequences 
of maturation. Learning how to experience such qualities 
means learning how to use your mind. But these 
achievements, as important as they are, are achievements of 
impression, not expression (Eisner, 1993). Representation, 
as I see it is not the mental representation discussed in 
cognitive science (Shepard, 1982; 1990) but, rather, the 
process of transformating the contents of consciousness into 
public form so that they can be stabilized, inspected, 
edited and shared with others. In sharing with others, 
students should be given opportunities to investigate and 
determine how cultural assumptions, frames of references, 
perspective, and the biases within a discipline influence 
the ways knowledge is constructed and represented. Students 
should also be given opportunities to create knowledge 
themselves and identify ways in which the knowledge they 
construct and represent is influenced and limited by their 
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personal assumptions, positions and experiences (Banks, 
1993). Representation is what confers a public social 
dimension to cognition. Since forms of representation 
differ, the kinds of experiences they make possible also 
differ. Different kinds of experience lead to different 
meanings, which, in turn, make different forms of 
understanding possible (Eisner, 1993). It was Rorty (1989) 
in support of this notion who concluded that it was the 
Romantics, who first understood the importance of 
perspective, the notion that "anything could be made to look 
good or bad, important or unimportant, by being redescribed" 
(p. 8) • 
Out of experience, concepts are formed. Concepts are 
imaginative distillations of the essential features of the 
experienced world. They can be used to generate 
possibilities, although never encountered directly in the 
environment itself. Our conceptual life, shaped by 
imagination and the qualities of the world experienced, 
gives rise to the intentions that direct our activities. 
Intentions are rooted in imagination. Intentions depend 
upon our ability to recognize what is, and yet to imagine 
what might be. Experience, however, is private. For 
experience to become public, we must find some means to 
represent it. This will lead us to the fourth part of this 
critical discourse, the transformative knowledge role in 
Multicultural education. Culture makes available to the 
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developing human an array of forms of representation through 
which the transformation of consciousness into its public 
equivalent is created. 
The fifth part of this critical discourse involves 
general principles applying to classroom methodology. These 
principles refer to schools which are culture's agencies for 
selectively developing competencies in the use of 
representational forms. Once public the content of 
consciousness is stabilized, and once stabilized, it can be 
edited, revised and shared. But representation is not a 
one-way street. Since experience can never be displayed in 
the form in which it initially appeared, the act of 
representation is also an act of invention: The act of 
representation provides its own unpredictable options, 
options that can only emerge in the course of action 
(Collingwood, 1958). 
This journey will lead me to the questions: How do 
these ideas about meaning and forms of representation 
pertain to schools and to what we teach? What relevance do 
they have for educational practice in multicultural 
curriculum? Can there be knowledge without transformation? 
Is knowledge without transformation meaningful? What kind 
of knowledge do we teach in schools? What are the 
implications for teaching? How do we relate our ideas and 
values to our own action? If our ideas become models, or in 
other words, if they are not applied creatively to reality, 
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do we run the risk of regarding them as reality? Should we 
consider these ideas as model or method? Must we consider 
these ideas as an absolute truth? Shall we restrict our 
conception of truth only to what science can provide? 
CHAPTER II 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Most of the theories that have influenced developmental 
research in the Western World have viewed individuals as 
separate from their social and physical environment. In 
these views, such as Jean Piaget's, development is seen 
primarily as an individual activity and the environment as 
simply an "influence on" an individual's development. This 
view is challenged by a number of other social belief 
systems and their corresponding psychological theories, many 
of them Eastern (e.g., Markus & Kitayama, 1991). Of this 
group, the most influential for present day developmental 
psychologists is the approach of the Soviet psychologist Lev 
Vygotsky and, more generally, the "Contextualists". In the 
Vygotsky-contextualist view, humans are embedded in a social 
matrix and human behavior cannot be understood independently 
of this matrix. Several recent influences and events have 
made developmentalists more receptive to the contextualists. 
Ethological (Bowlby, 1958) and Gibsonian (Gibson, 1984) 
theorists directed our attention to the purpose of behaviors 
for daily life and the fit between human abilities and our 
ecological niche. However, they do not focus on the social-
cultural aspects of this niche as much as do the 
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contexturalists. In addition, the findings of domain-
specific developments by the neo-Piagetians also increased 
our interest in the contexts of development. However, the 
concern was with the nature of particular tasks or domains 
of knowledge rather than the socially embedded nature of all 
types of knowledge. The contextual approach balances these 
trends. One of the spokespersons of the contextualists' 
belief similar to Vygotsky is Rogoff (1990) who describes 
the Contextual position in this way, 
The purpose of thinking is to act effectively; 
activities are goal directed (tacitly or explicitly), 
with social and cultural definition of goals and means 
of handling problems. The structure of problems that 
humans attempt to solve, the knowledge base that 
provides resources, and the strategies for solution 
that are considered more or less effective or 
sophisticated are situated in a social matrix of 
purposes and values. The problems that are posed, the 
tools that are available to solve them, and the tactics 
that are favored build on the sociocultural definitions 
and available technologies with which an individual 
functions (Rogoff, 1990, p. 6). 
In focusing on the most influential Contextualist--
Vygotsky--in order to understand his background, we have to 
reflect back on the European Psychology which provides the 
initial setting for Vygotsky's theories. Until the latter 
half of the nineteenth century the study of man's nature was 
the province of Philosophy. The intellectual ancestors of 
John Locke in England had developed his Empiricist 
explanation of mind, which emphasized the origin of ideas 
from environmentally produced sensations. The British 
Empiricists had a difficult time describing the laws of 
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association by which simple sensations combine to produce 
complex ideas. On the other hand the followers of Immanuel 
Kant argued that ideas of space and time and concepts of 
quantity, quality, and relation originate in the human mind 
and cannot be broken down into simpler elements. Neither 
side budged from its position. Both of these philosophical 
traditions were operating under the assumption, dating from 
the work of Rene Descartes, that the scientific study of man 
could apply only to his physical body. 
While the conflict between these two approaches extends 
to the present day, three books published in the 1860s 
changed the terms of discussion. Most famous was Darwin's 
Origin of the Species, which argued the essential continuity 
of man and other animals. The second book was Gustay 
Fechner's Die Psychophysik, which provided a detailed, 
mathematically sophisticated description of the relation 
between changes in specifiable physical events and 
verbalizable "psychic" responses. The third book was 
entitled Reflexes of the Brain, written by a Moscow 
physician, I. M. Sechenov. These books by Darwin, Fechner, 
and Sechenov can be viewed as essential constituents of 
psychological thought at the end of the nineteenth century. 
Darwin linked animals and humans in a single conceptual 
system regulated by natural laws. Fechner provided an 
example of what a natural law describing the relationship 
between physical events and human mental functioning might 
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look like. Sechenov, extrapolating from muscle twitches in 
frogs, proposed a physiological theory of how such mental 
processes worked within the normally functioning individual. 
These men provided the central questions in psychology in 
the second half of the century which became the concern of 
many young psychologists. What are the relationships 
between animal and human behavior; environmental and mental 
events; between physiological and psychological processes? 
Various schools of psychology attacked one or another of 
these questions, providing partial answers within 
theoretically limited perspectives. 
The first School was that of W. Wundt in 1880. Wundt 
took as his task the description of the contents of human 
consciousness and their relation to external stimulation. 
Wundt postulated the explicit view that complex mental 
functions or higher psychological processes (voluntary 
remembering and deductive reasoning, for example), could not 
in principle be studied by experimental psychologists. By 
the beginning of World War I, the study of human conscious 
processes came under attack from two fronts: The United 
States and Russia. United States and Russian psychologists, 
discontented with the controversies surrounding sensations, 
renounced the study of consciousness in favor of the study 
of behavior. The second line of attack on descriptions of 
the contents of consciousness came from a group of 
psychologists who objected to the one point upon which Wundt 
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and the behaviorists agreed: the appropriateness of 
analytical breaking down psychological processes into their 
basic constituents. The movement, which came to be known as 
Gestalt psychology, demonstrated that many intellectual 
phenomena and perceptual phenomena could not be accounted 
for in terms of either of the basic elements of 
consciousness postulated by Wundt. This was the situation 
in European psychology when Vygotsky's ideas first emerged. 
The situation was not very different in Russia. 
Cole, John-Steiner, Scribner, and Souberman (1978) 
stated that when Vygotsky came on to the scene in Russia he 
presented a lecture entitled: "Consciousness as an object 
of the Psychology of Behavior" (p. 5). In his view none of 
the existing schools of psychology provided a firm 
foundation for establishing a unified theory of human 
psychological processes. He saw psychology as being in 
crisis. For Vygotsky's Gestalt contemporaries, a crisis 
existed because established theories (primarily Wundt's and 
Watsonian behaviorism) could not, in their view, explain 
complex perceptual and problem solving behaviors. He shared 
the Gestalt psychologists' dissatisfaction with 
psychological analysis that began by reducing all phenomena 
to a set of psychological "atoms." But he felt that the 
Gestalt psychologist failed to move beyond the description 
of complex phenomena to the explanation of them. Even if 
one were to accept the Gestalt criticisms of previous 
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approaches, a crisis would still exist because psychology 
would remain split into two irreconcilable halves: a 
"natural science" branch that could explain elementary 
sensory and reflex processes, and a "mental science" half 
that could describe emergent properties of higher 
psychological processes. What Vygotsky sought was a 
comprehensive approach that would make possible the 
description and explanation of higher psychological 
functions in terms acceptable to natural science. To 
Vygotsky, explanation meant a great deal. It included 
identification of the brain mechanisms underlying a 
particular function. It included a detailed explication of 
their developmental history to establish the relation 
between simple and complex forms of what appeared to be the 
same behavior, and, importantly, it included specification 
of the societal context in which the behavior developed. 
This was an ambitious goal for Vygotsky and he could not 
reach it before his death in 1933. 
Vygotsky was known for his constructed penetrating 
critique of the notion that an understanding of the higher 
psychological functions in humans can be found by a 
multiplication and complication of principles derived from 
animal psychology, in particular those principles that 
represent the mechanical combination of stimulus-response 
laws. He also made a critique of theories which claim that 
the properties of adult intellectual functions arise from 
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maturation alone, or are in any way pre-formed in the child 
and are simply waiting for an opportunity to manifest 
themselves. In the issue of social origins of language and 
thinking, Vygotsky followed the lead of influential French 
sociologists, but to my knowledge he was the first modern 
psychologist to suggest the mechanisms by which culture 
becomes a part of each person's nature. Insisting that 
psychological functions are a product of the brain's 
activity, he became an early advocate of combining 
experimental cognitive psychology with neurology and 
physiology. He laid the foundation for a unified behavioral 
science. 
Vygotsky's Theoretical Framework 
A central tenet of Vygotsky's theory is that all 
phenomena can be studied as processes in motion and in 
change. In terms of the subject matter of psychology, the 
scientist's task is to reconstruct the origin and course of 
development of behavior and consciousness. Not only does 
every phenomenon have its history, but this history is 
characterized by changes both qualitative (changes in form 
and structure and basic characteristics) and quantitative. 
Vygotsky applied this line of reasoning to explain the 
transformation of elementary psychological processes into 
complex ones. Thus the schism between natural scientific 
studies of elementary processes and speculative reflection 
on forms of behavior might be bridged by tracing the 
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qualitative changes in behavior occurring in the course of 
development. 
Marx's theory of society (known as historical 
materialism) also played a fundamental role in Vygotsky's 
thinking. According to Marx, historical changes in society 
and material life produce changes in "human nature" 
(consciousness and behavior) . Vygotsky attempted to relate 
this assumption to concrete psychological questions. In 
this effort he creatively elaborated on Engels' concept of 
human labor and tool use as the means by which man changes 
nature and, in so doing, transforms himself. The major 
premise in Vygotsky's formulation was the view that man was 
subject to the dialectical play between nature and history, 
between his qualities as a creature of biology and as a 
product of human culture. In relating Marxism to psychology 
Vygotsky (1978) made explicit the way in which he thought 
its basic methodological principles might contribute to 
theory building in psychology: 
I don't want to discover the nature of mind by patching 
together a lot of quotations. I want to find out how 
science has to be built, to approach the study of the 
mind having learned the whole of Marx's method .... In 
order to create such an enabling theory-method in the 
generally accepted scientific manner, it is necessary 
to discover the essence of the given area of phenomena, 
the laws according to which they change, their 
qualitative and quantitative characteristics, their 
causes. It is necessary to formulate the categories 
and concepts that are specifically relevant to them in 
other words, to create one's own Capital (Vygotsky, 
1978, p. 8). 
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This frame of mind was the guiding principle which directed 
Vygotsky in his theoretical beliefs. 
The Intellectual and Social Setting 
Vygotsky and present day contextualists share certain 
assumptions but they have certain differences, mainly in 
areas of emphasis, which are pointed out below. The 
literature stresses the main characteristics as: the role 
of the child-in-activity-in-context as the unit of study, 
the zone of proximal development, the sociocultural origins 
of mental functioning, the mediation of intellectual 
functioning by tools provided by culture, and the 
contextualist methodology. 
Child in Context 
Vygotsky and contextualists hold that rather than focus 
on the child himself, they view the child participating in 
some event as the smallest meaningful unit of study. A 
child is not a constant, universal organism operating in a 
vacuum. Instead, the child and the development of the mind 
are inherently social: "The path from object to child and 
from child to object passes through another person" 
(Vygotsky, 1978). The child, the other person, and the 
social context are fused in some activity. The social-
cultural-historical context defines and shapes any 
particular child and his experience. On the other hand the 
child affects his/her context. In effect looking at a child 
while ignoring his context distorts our concept of the 
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nature of children. Focusing on a child alone tends to 
encourage us to look for causes of behavior within the child 
rather than in the context. Rogoff (1990) in support of 
this view stated that the individual's efforts and 
sociocultural arrangements and involvement are inseparable, 
mutually embedded focuses of interest. Rogoff regards all 
human activity as embedded in context. She puts it this way 
In the contextual perspective, meaning and context are 
not elements that can be handled separately or derived 
from adding elements together. Context is not so much 
a set of stimuli that impinge upon a person as it is a 
web of relations interwoven to form the fabric of 
meaning (p. 149). 
Other theories did emphasize the interaction between 
children and their environments. The difference is that the 
previous accounts consider the person and the environment to 
be separate entities that enter into interactions. In 
contrast, contextualists view this perceived separation as 
artificial and distorting. Instead, a single unit or 
process exists and through certain forms of social practice 
relate the child and his/her needs and goals to the 
environment and define what the environment means to the 
child. 
What is a Context? 
Bronfenbrenner (1989, pp. 226-229) views contexts in 
many levels. He postulates that "ecological psychology" 
depicts the environment as a system of nested structures, 
ranging from the immediate face-to-face interaction with 
another person to general all encompassing cultural belief 
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systems. The first structure is what he called a 
microsystem which is a "pattern of activities, roles, and 
interpersonal relations experienced by the developing person 
in a given face-to -face setting." The second structure is 
what he called the mesosystem which includes "the linkages 
and processes taking place between two or more settings 
containing the developing person." For example, we might 
ask if the peer group and school system support or 
contradict the parents' value system. Thus, a mesosystem is 
a system of microsystems. The third structure is what 
Bronfenbrenner called the exosystem which "encompasses the 
linkage and processes taking place between two or more 
settings at least one of which does not ordinarily contain 
the developing person." Events in this system influence 
processes within the immediate setting that do contain that 
person. An example is the relation between the home and the 
parent's work place. A stressful work environment may 
increase a parent's irritability at home, which could lead 
to child abuse. This level includes the major institutions 
of society, such as the economic system, the transportation 
system, local government, and the mass media. The fourth 
structure is what he called the macrosystem which "consists 
of the overarching pattern of micro-mesa-and exosystems 
characteristics of a given culture, subculture, or other 
broader social context." This system is a general cultural 
"blueprint" that helps design the social structures and 
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activities occurring at lower, more concrete levels. This 
blueprint influences how parents, teachers, or significant 
others in the child's life "consciously or unconsciously 
define the goals, risks, and ways of raising the next 
generation" (Bronfenbrenner, 1989). There tends to be 
consistency among the important settings of a particular 
culture. Bronfenbrenner points out that within a given 
society, one elementary school classroom looks and operates 
much like every other. The nature of the prototypic 
classroom reflects unstated values of the society. 
It is important to understand that all of these levels 
of social context also incorporate physical and historical 
influences. The climate, type of terrain, urban or rural 
setting, population density, health care, and physical risks 
are intertwined with social contexts. Culture is, to a 
great extent, a group's response to its physical ecology, 
which includes biases toward certain forms of economic 
activity, such as farming or hunting. These activities in 
turn dictate a particular social organization and division 
of labor, which in turn influence child-rearing practices 
(Miller, 1993). Vygotsky emphasized that the history of a 
culture powerfully shapes all levels of contexts. Wars, 
natural disasters, revolutions, and civil rights movements 
reverberate at all contextual levels. At any one point in 
history a culture is both a product of its own history and a 
provider of contexts that shape children's development and, 
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consequently, the future of the culture. This view of 
Vygotsky is consonant with Freire's (1992) belief that 
a culture of the people should not only furnish the 
elements to change, or rediscover, power, but also the 
elements to rediscover culture, language, literature 
and art, to rediscover the way in which people eat and 
drink, in short, to rediscover life. Because, in the 
final definition, creating a new society means a 
rediscovery of society and in the process a rediscovery 
of ourselves, a recreation of ourselves, because, by 
recreating ourselves, individually and socially, we 
shall change society (p. 82). 
Vygotsky stated that it is essential to view the cognitive 
activities of individuals within the cultural context in 
which their thinking is embedded. For him, the mind grows 
neither naturally nor unassisted. It is determined neither 
by its history nor by the logical constraints of its present 
operations. Intelligence, for him, is readiness to use 
culturally transmitted knowledge and procedures as processes 
of mind (Bruner, 1986). The human heritage is notable for 
the cultural legacy of values and skills, which each new 
individual inherits from near and distant ancestors and 
practices with the assistance of caregivers and the 
companionship of peers. Freire (1987) agreed with Vygotsky 
by stating that 
culture is not only artistic or intellectual phenomena 
expressed through thought: culture is to be seen above 
all in the simplest actions of everyday life-culture is 
eating in a different way, shaking hands in a different 
way, relating to people in a different way .... Culture 
for us, I would insist, includes the whole range of 
human activity, including everyday life (p. 21). 
Rogoff (1990) in reflecting this cultural legacy of values 
and skills in a culture and how people see other cultures 
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differently quoted a reply by the Indians of the Five 
Nations to an invitation sent in 1744 by the commissioners 
from Virginia inviting the Indians to send boys to William 
and Mary College: 
You who are wise must know, that different nations have 
different conceptions of things; and you will therefore 
not take it amiss, if our ideas of this kind of 
education happen not to be the same with yours. We 
have had some experience of it: Several of our young 
people were formerly brought up at the colleges of the 
Northern Provinces; they were instructed in all your 
sciences; but when they came back to us ... [they were] 
ignorant of every means of living in the woods ... 
neither fit for hunters, warriors, or counselors; they 
were totally good for nothing. We are, however, not 
the less obliged by your kind offer ... and to show our 
grateful sense of it, if the gentlemen of Virginia will 
send us a dozen of their sons, we will take great care 
of their education, instruct them in all we know, and 
make men of them" (Drake, Biography and History of the 
Indians of North America) (Rogoff, 1990, p. 42). 
Rogoff (1990) stated that the examination of cognitive 
processes in different cultures or historical periods brings 
to light the sociocultural channeling of individual 
thinking, as with the fish that is unaware of water until it 
is out of it. Smedslund (1984) argues that psychology is 
not an exploration of the unknown but an explication of the 
well-known. People have a propensity to assume that the 
perspective on reality provided by their own community is 
the only proper or sensible one (Berger & Luckmann, 1966; 
Campbell & Levine, 1961) and to view the practices of others 
as barbaric. Riegel (1973) argued that the ancient Greeks 
facilitated their own cultural identity by downgrading 
people with different language, customs, and conceptions of 
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human nature. Indeed, the word barbarous derived from the 
Greek term for 11 foreign 11 , 11 rude 11 , and 11 ignorant 11 ( Skeat, 
1974), applied to neighboring tribes who spoke languages 
unintelligible to the Greeks (who heard only "bar-bar" when 
they spoke) . 
Researchers and scholars are as prone to such 
assumptions as are others. For example, Neisser (1976) 
points out that self-centered definitions of intelligence 
form the basis of intelligence tests. He puts it this way: 
Academic people are among the stoutest def enders of the 
notion of intelligence ... the tests seem so obviously 
valid to us who are members of the academic 
community .... There is no doubt that Academic 
Intelligence is really important for the kind of work 
that we do. We readily slip into believing that it is 
important for every kind of significant work .... Thus, 
academic people are in the position of having focused 
their professional activities around a particular 
personal quality, as instantiated in a certain set of 
skills. We have then gone on to define the quality in 
terms of this skill set, and ended by asserting that 
persons who lack these special skills are unintelligent 
altogether (p. 138). 
In recent years psychologists typically have studied 
cultural by comparing cultures and emphasizing differences 
in behavior. As Cole (1992) points out, however, this 
culture-as-difference approach ignores the fact that the 
ability to construct and operate in a culturally organized 
environment is a universal, species-specific characteristic 
of humans. We need to understand these universal mechanisms 
of cultural influences as well as the diversity of content 
they produce. In the culture-as-medium approach, culture 
organizes the child's everyday experiences. As a culture 
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develops over many generations it provides artifacts that 
mediate between people and between people and their physical 
environment. Culture-as-difference studies can of course 
lead to culture-as-medium studies by spotlighting the 
critical events in the child's life that express a 
particular cultural attitude that push the child in a 
particular direction. The more distant levels of context, 
such as cultural beliefs about what kinds of skills children 
should acquire, often reach a child through the immediate 
social situation in which a child acts is in activities with 
a parent, sibling, or peer that encourage these skills. 
Vygotsky expressed this process in his most well known 
concept: the Zone of Proximal Development. 
Zone of Proximal Development 
Vygotsky (1987) defined the zone of proximal 
development as 
the distance between a child's actual developmental 
level as determined by independent problem solving and 
the higher level of potential development as 
determined through problem solving under adult guidance 
or in collaboration with more capable peers (p. 379). 
A more competent person collaborates with a child to help 
him move from where he is now to where he can be. This 
person accomplishes this feat by means of prompts, clues, 
modeling, explanation, leading questions, discussion, joint 
participation, encouragement, control of the child's 
attention, and so on. Vygotsky explained this proce$s by 
saying: 
29 
We propose that an essential feature of learning is 
that it creates the zone of proximal development, that 
is, learning awakens a variety of internal 
developmental processes that are able to operate only 
when the child is interacting with people in his 
environment and in cooperation with his peers. Once 
these processes are internalized, they become part of 
the child's independent developmental achievement. 
The voyage across the zone through the tutorial process was 
made possible only by language. Language provides the way 
to higher ground. Another example of this guided 
participation came from Rogoff (1990) and involves children 
and their caregivers and companions in the collaborative 
process of (1) building bridges from children's present 
understanding and skills to reach new understanding and 
skills, and (2) arranging and structuring children's 
participation in activities, with dynamic shifts over 
development in children's responsibilities. Children use 
social resources for guidance both in the support of and in 
the challenge of assuming increasingly skilled roles in the 
activities of their community. From guided participation 
involving shared understanding and problem solving, children 
appropriate an increasingly advanced understanding of and 
skill in managing the intellectual problems of their 
community. Vygotsky described the relation between the 
actual and potential levels as follows: 
The zone of proximal development defines those 
functions that have not yet matured but are in the 
process of maturation, functions that will mature 
tomorrow but are currently in an embryonic state. 
These functions could be termed the "buds" or "flowers" 
of development rather than the fruits of development. 
The actual developmental level characterizes mental 
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development retrospectively, while the zone of proximal 
development characterizes mental development 
prospectively (pp. 86-87). 
Vygotsky and other contextualists held that development can 
be understood only by looking directly at the process of 
change, not a static child frozen in one developmental 
moment. Process is more important than product. They look 
at the child's series of actions and thoughts as she/he 
tries to solve a problem and, in the process, advance he/her 
own thinking. Rather than focus on what concepts the child 
has they examine what concepts a child actually does use 
over time when involved in activity and when engaged with 
people and objects. Vygotsky took his developmental stance 
not only for short-term learning, when moving through the 
zone and long-term development throughout childhood, but 
also for the development of a species over many generations 
and for sociocultural history. He stated that to study a 
child's development means 
to study in the process of change ... To encompass in 
research the process of a given thing's development in 
all its phases and changes from birth to death 
fundamentally means to discover its nature, its 
essence, for it is only in movement that a body shows 
what it is (p. 65). 
As we shall see later in this research, this view has 
important implications for how one assesses a child's 
ability. It also speaks to instruction. Instruction, 
whether formal schooling or informal apprenticeships, should 
be based on children's potential level more than on their 
actual level. Vygotsky was particularly interested in how 
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the zone operates in explicitly instructional settings. 
Instruction is based on the assumption that it is mainly by 
changing social interaction that one can change a child's 
own functioning. Palincsar and Brown (1984, 1988) have 
incorporated this notion in their "reciprocal teaching" 
intervention program in which a child alternates between the 
roles of questioner and respondent during reading lessons. 
A main goal is a shift from teacher regulated activity to 
child self-regulation (Moll 1990). Rogoff (1990) added some 
thing on the extension of the notion of the zone. She 
emphasized that adults need not explicitly instruct children 
in face-to-face interaction, children can learn from skilled 
adults at a distance by observing everyday activities in 
which there is no intention to teach the child. Instruction 
can be implicit as well as explicit. Learning is a natural 
by-product of involvement in tasks with adults or more 
competent peers. Any verbal explanation occurs naturally 
while working together rather than as part of intentional 
instruction. Instructions in the zone do not have to be 
verbal, especially those involving infants and young 
children. Their behaviors resemble those 
appropriate for anyone learning in an unfamiliar 
culture, who study near a trusted guide, watch the 
guide's activities and get involved in the activities 
when possible, and attend to any instruction the guide 
provides (Rogoff, 1990, p. 17). 
To put it simply, action speaks more than words. 
Rogoff (1990) expresses these ideas in her notion of 
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guided participation, which 
involves collaboration and shared understanding in 
routine problem solving activities. Instruction with 
other people assists children in their development by 
guiding their participation in relevant activities, 
helping them adapt their understanding to new 
instructions, structuring their problem solving 
attempts, and assisting them in assuming responsibility 
for managing problem solving .... Routine arrangements 
... guide children's increasingly skilled and 
appropriate participation in the daily activities 
valued in their culture (p. 191). 
Development as Apprenticeship 
Children share in the views and values of the more 
expert partner, offer their own views, and engage in the 
process of stretching their concepts to find a common 
ground. They are encouraged to try out their emerging 
skills in the task. Rogoff (1990) uses the metaphor of 
apprenticeship to capture the notion of children's active 
verbal or nonverbal participation in real life settings with 
more skilled, supportive others. The notion of 
apprenticeship as a model for children's cognitive 
development is appealing because it focuses our attention on 
the use of other people in social organizing development, on 
the active support and use of other people in social 
interaction and arrangements of tasks and activities, and on 
the socioculturally ordered nature of the institutional 
contexts, technologies, and goals of cognitive activities. 
Although young children clearly differ from older novices in 
the extent to which they can control their attention and 
communication and in their general knowledge, there is a 
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useful parallel between the role of young children and the 
roles of novices in general in apprenticeship. These 
cultural apprenticeships provide the beginner with access to 
both the overt aspects of the skill and to the more hidden 
inner processes of thought. In most traditional societies, 
education takes place largely within the family environment 
of young children. Often these families are extended, 
including assorted kin at each of several generations. In 
such traditional environments, it is assumed that children 
will follow in their parents' footsteps, sons typically 
carrying out the same vocational practices as their fathers, 
and daughters emulating the child-rearing, household, and 
vocational practices of their mothers. 
A cultural apprenticeship can be illustrated by the way 
in which Nigerian boys and girls emulate their fathers and 
mothers in the arts of mat making (What we call "akirika" in 
Igbo). We use these arts for roofing houses, a very 
important skill in our culture. At a very young age the 
young boys and girls witness their elders carrying out these 
roles, often through mentors drawn from several generations, 
spanning the gamut from great-grandparents to siblings. 
Most learning occurs through direct observation, although 
such learning-by-watching will certainly be punctuated on 
occasion by overt instructions, the invoking of specific 
rules, or explicit demonstrations of procedures that ,may not 
be readily observable or have even been considered secret. 
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The society may well mark important transitions with 
explicit ceremonies, such as rites of passage into 
adulthood, but these serve as a symbolic affirmation of 
learnings and understandings that have already been 
assimilated or at least thoroughly prepared for. At age 
four, children are already learning how to collect materials 
from the palm leaves and at age seven they are in the 
process of doing it as the adults do. During a period of 
time that often stretches over several years, the boys gain 
mastery in the designated trade or skill. Much of the 
learning is observational, either of the parents themselves 
or of others, already trained workers who still remain under 
the tutelage of elders. The elders will occasionally point 
out errors or make special demonstrations, and the 
apprentice is also expected to use his own emerging critical 
capacities to correct and improve his performance. For the 
majority of the boys their first way of earning money would 
be by making mats and selling them. For the girls they are 
more involved in the art of weaving. Young girls first gain 
familiarity with weaving by watching their mothers at work. 
Later they help boil the threads and dye the wool. At about 
the age of seven, they make their first serious efforts to 
learn to weave. The mother initially provides considerable 
guidance, a mix of talking and demonstrating the art of 
weaving. But as the young girl gains facility, the overt 
instruction diminishes until, by the age of 10 or 12, the 
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young girl is able to proceed on her own. In some parts of 
Nigeria-Opobo, the Eastern State, they are especially known 
for weaving. It is now one of the industries that exists 
there. Everything is done by hand. The young girls in this 
area start the art of weaving very early in life. A lot of 
African Americans are now using the weaving of cloth for 
dressing as a cultural exhibit of their Fatherland Custom. 
Learning within the zone is possible in part because of 
what Rogoff (1990) called intersubjectivity and shared 
understanding, based on a common focus of attention and a 
common goal, between a child and a more competent person. 
It must be emphasized that instruction within the zone is 
not unidirectional. The child's behavior affects the 
adult's behavior as much as the adult's behavior affects the 
child. The child actively constructs new knowledge and 
skills with the help of more skilled others. Children 
actively contribute in that process. Motivated to learn, 
they invite the adult to participate and gradually assume 
more responsibility for carrying out the activity. The 
adult adjusts the level of guidance to the child's response. 
Furthermore, according to Rogoff the apprenticeship model 
has the advantage of including more people than a single 
expert and a single novice. The apprenticeship system often 
involves a group of novices (peers) who serve as resources 
for one another in exploring their new domain and aiding and 
challenging one another. Current contextualist approaches, 
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especially those of Rogoff (1990) and Bronfenbrenner (1989), 
emphasize the children's active role in their own 
development. The term collaborate is often used to reflect 
the child's equal contribution. Integrated with Vygotsky's 
framework, the notion is that a child is an active partner 
in the process of moving through the zone of proximal 
development. Children seek out certain social contexts, ask 
more skilled adults for help in these contexts, and 
gradually take on more responsibility in these settings. 
The Sociocultural Origins of Mental Functioning 
What happens to children cognitively when they interact 
with adults? Vygotsky answered by stating that interaction 
between a child and an adult on the inter-mental plane 
become internalized into the child's mind, the intra-mental 
plane. In other words the external becomes internal. In 
effect, thinking is always social and reflects the culture 
in which the dyad operates. Thinking, remembering, and 
attending are activities not only of an individual; they are 
interaction between individuals. Vygotsky (1960) expresses 
it this way: 
any higher intellectual function acquired during 
development appears twice, or on two planes... It 
appears first between people as an intermental 
category, and then within the child as an intramental 
category. This is equally true with regard to 
voluntary attention, logical memory, the formation of 
concepts, and the development of will (pp. 197-198). 
This connection from the inter-mental to the intra-mental 
explains why a child in context is the smallest possible 
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unit to study and the zone of proximal development. Intra-
mental activity cannot be divorced from inter-mental 
activity between children and people in their social 
context. The internalization of social processes can be 
seen during a child's movement through the zone of proximal 
development. Children eventually internalize the mode of 
problem solving that was first supported socially. Vygotsky 
expressed it in this form: "children grow into the 
intellectual life of those around them" (1978, p. 88). 
Freire (1989) rightly put it "in order to discover 
ourselves, we need to see ourselves in the other, to 
understand the other in order to understand ourselves, to 
enter into the other" (p. 14). Vygotsky stated that both 
social interaction and the language involved are 
internalized. In a sense, children mentally interact with 
themselves as they did earlier with other people. Children 
gradually take on more and more responsibility for problem 
solving and become more self regulated rather than other 
regulated. Freire (1989) sees this discovery learning 
process as not an easy task and therefore needs tolerance. 
He concludes: 
And, since different languages have left their imprint 
upon us, and we are used to different gestures, 
different styles of relationships, this new learning 
process of discovery, of relating to the world in a new 
way, takes a long time. And yet the differences are 
the starting point for this learning process. You 
discover people who are different and, linked with that 
discovery of other people, the need to be tolerant of 
them. This means that through the differences between 
us we must learn to be tolerant of those who are 
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different, and not to judge them according to our own 
values, but according to their values, which are 
different from ours. And here it seems to me to be 
fundamental to link the concept of culture with the 
concepts of difference and tolerance (Freire, 1989, p. 
21) . 
From my own perspective, this means transformation, a 
change, going from the unknown to the known. It adds new 
knowledge for an individual. This confirms Marxist 
philosophy that social activity shapes the mind and that a 
collectivist society shares the knowledge and experience 
with less advanced members of society. As Freire (1978) 
pointed out, human activity consists of action and 
reflection. It is praxis. It is transformation of the 
world. And as praxis, it requires theory to illuminate it. 
Human activity is theory and practice; reflection and 
action. This action and reflection, in my mind, cannot 
proceed without the action and reflection of others. 
One particularly important aspect of society is 
language which we shall treat in depth later. Just as two 
people communicate with each other, so does a child 
communicate with himself as he thinks. Internalization of 
interpersonal communication leads to intrapersonal 
communications during development. Despite the emphasis of. 
both Vygotsky and Piaget on the idea that the individual and 
the environment are inseparable for understanding 
intellectual development, they differed in both the 
centrality of the role of the social world in their theories 
of development, and in the way in which they conceived the 
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role of the social world and the individual. Vygotsky was 
interested in development of skill in the use of societal 
intellectual tools, especially language for handling 
intellectual problems, whereas Piaget was interested in the 
transformations of perspective that characterize advances in 
mathematical and physical reasoning. The two also differ in 
the process of collaboration which they say will occur 
between partners. Vygotsky focused on shared problem 
solving, in which the partners collaborate to reach a joint 
solution to problems, whereas Piaget focused on reciprocal 
examination of logical statements by partners. With 
Vygotsky, the cognitive process is shared between people; 
with Piaget, the social process provides individuals with 
the opportunity to see alternatives and to explore the 
logical consequences of their own positions, in a meeting of 
minds as opposed to a shared thinking process. The process, 
but not the content, is similar for Vygotsky. However, in 
these two theorists, Vygotsky and Piaget, there is a common 
concept in knowledge processing because in each theory there 
is a choice to be made in exploring knowledge by the 
individual in a meeting of minds or shared thinking process. 
For Vygotsky, the structure of conversations becomes the 
structure of thought. Collaboration and dialogue between 
two people leads to these sorts of mental activity during 
individual private thought. Although Piaget also recognized 
the influence of other people on a developing child, he 
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emphasized internalization of regularities in the child's 
motoric interactions with physical objects. He did not 
address the changing nature of society itself during the 
life of an individual or over generations. 
How can shared problem solving result in changes in the 
skills of an individual? Rogoff explains this by stating: 
The individual's use of this shared understanding is 
not the same as what was constructed jointly; it is an 
appropriation of the shared activity by each individual 
that reflects the individual's understanding of and 
involvement in the activity (1990, p. 195). 
She uses an analogy of the constant exchange of water and 
air between the body and the environment. Just as bodies 
filter and transform air and water to meet biological needs, 
so do our minds assimilate these social activities in our 
social sea to our current needs and abilities. In the 
process, minds are changed. Rogoff (1990) favors the notion 
of appropriation over internalization because the latter 
connotes a barrier between the individual and interpersonal 
aspects of functioning. For her a barrier does not exist. 
She argues that because internal and external are naturally 
blended in the shared meaning of social exchanges, there are 
no barriers between self and other; internal and external 
are not separate. In this view, children's changed 
understanding is a natural by-product of their participation 
in joint thinking, not an external idea gone underground. 
Mediation of Intellectual Functioning by Tools 
Provided by Culture 
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Vygotsky's theory was built on the premise that 
individual intellectual development cannot be understood 
without reference to the social milieu in which the child is 
embedded. For Vygotsky, children's cognitive development 
must be understood not only as taking place with social 
support in interaction with others, but also as involving 
the development of ability to skillfully use the 
sociohistorically developed tools that mediate intellectual 
activity. He stated that this individual development of 
higher mental processes cannot be understood without 
considering the social roots of both the tools for thinking 
that children are learning to use and the social 
interactions that guide children in their use. Peers and 
adults assist in this self-shaping process by helping 
children learn how to use their culture's psychological and 
technical tools. Psychological tools include language 
systems, counting systems, physical devices such as 
computers and works of art. People use psychological tools 
to control thoughts or behavior, just as they use technical 
tools such as axes and plows to control nature. Both kinds 
of tools mediate between the child and the environment. 
However, technical tools are externally oriented towards 
changing objects whereas psychological tools are internally 
oriented towards changing ways of thinking and controlling 
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and organizing behavior. In Vygotsky's view, the child's 
individual mental functioning develops through experience 
with cultural tools in joint problem solving with more 
skilled partners working in the zone of proximal 
development. In a fascinating essay on the philosophical 
basis of activity theory as proposed by Vygotsky and argued 
philosophically by Ilyenkov, Bakhurst (1988) maintains that 
the tenets of activity theory require a radical shift in 
world view from the predominant Cartesian philosophy, which 
stresses the individual. The shift makes individual 
thinking a function of social activity in which the 
individual internalizes the ways of thinking and acting that 
have developed in sociocultural history; mind is "in 
society": 
The idealization of nature by human practice transforms 
the natural world into an object of thought, and by 
participating in those practices, the human individual 
is brought into contact with reality as an object of 
thought. Each child enters the world with the forms of 
movement constitutive of thought embodied in the 
environment surrounding him or her, and as he or she is 
led to reproduce those practices so he or she becomes a 
thinking being, a person (Bakhurst, 1988, p.37). 
Vygotsky (1987) held that children play an active role 
in their development. Critics have accused Vygotsky of 
overlooking the role of natural factors in development, 
factors assumed to be available to human infants through 
genetic development (Nertsch, 1985) . The higher mental 
processes were his greatest interest, those that make use of 
cultural mediators to extend human thinking beyond the 
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natural level characteristic of other animals or of 
involuntary mental processes in humans. As long as these 
higher mental processes, such as voluntary attention and 
voluntary memory, rely on the use of these tools, it makes 
sense to emphasize the social context of the origin of the 
tools and their transmission to children. Culture creates 
these tools to help people master the environment, the 
favored tools are passed on to children during social 
interchanges, and in turn the tools shape children's minds. 
Children use these tools to help themselves think. Tools 
actually transform thought. For example, once language is 
used to help memory, the nature of remembering may change to 
a more verbal form. 
Thought and Language 
Vygotsky presents a sophisticated argument 
demonstrating that language, the very means by which 
reflection and elaboration of experience take place, is a 
highly personal and at the same time a profoundly social 
human process. He sees the relation between the individual 
and the society as a dialectical process which, like a river 
and its tributaries, combines and separates the different 
elements of human life. For Vygotsky, language is the most 
important psychological tool. He sees it as a means by 
which we free ourselves from our immediate perceptual 
experience and allows us to represent the unseen, the past, 
and the future. For him thinking and language are 
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dynamically related; comprehending and producing language 
are processes that transform, not merely influence, the 
process of thinking. Vygotsky (1978) sees language as 
altering the entire flow and structure of mental functions. 
It does this by determining the structure of a new 
instrumental act, just as a technical tool alters the 
process of a natural adaption by determining the form of 
labor operations. "Just as mold give shape to a substance, 
words can shape an activity into a structure" (Vygotsky, 
1978, p. 28). Francis Bacon, cited by Vygotsky, proclaimed 
that neither mind alone nor hand alone can accomplish much 
without the aids and tools that perfect them. And principal 
among those aids and tools are language and the canons of 
its use (Bruner, 1986). Language is primarily a social 
device for social contact, communication, and interpersonal 
influence. This social tool goes into the mental 
underground to direct thinking, control one's own behavior 
during development, organize categories of reality, 
represent the past, and plan for the future. Gollnick and 
Chinn (1994) see language as the means by which we 
communicate. It is that which makes our behavior human. 
can incite anger, elicit love, inspire bravery, and arouse 
fear. It binds groups of people together. Language and 
dialect serve as a focal point for cultural identity and 
provide a common bond for individuals with the same 
linguistic heritage, who often share the same feelings, 
It 
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beliefs, and behaviors (p. 220). Dewey sees language as the 
tool of tools. Dewey (1925/1981) wrote, "As to be a tool, 
or to be used as means for consequences, is to have and to 
endow with meaning, language, being the tool of tools, is 
the cherishing mother of all significance" (p. 146) . To 
appreciate the full significance of this statement, we must 
strive to understand exactly what Dewey meant by it. Quine 
(1969) felt that, if we see language in behavioral terms, 
then there cannot be, in any useful sense, a private 
language. This point was stressed by Dewey in the 
twenties ... 
Language is specifically a mode of interaction of at 
least two beings, a speaker and a hearer; it 
presupposes an organized group to which these creatures 
belong, and from whom they have acquired their habits 
of speech. It is therefore a relationship (p. 77). 
Quine (1969) is correct. The core of Dewey's behavioral 
theory of meaning, and perhaps the core of his entire 
philosophy, is his argument for the natural origin of 
language in shared behavior. Dewey and Vygotsky also seem 
to share similar views about language. Vygotsky (1978) 
believed that, 
Language arises initially as a means of communication 
between the child and the people in his environment. 
Only subsequently, upon conversion to internal speech, 
does it come to organize the child's thought, that is, 
become an internal mental function (p. 89). 
Compare this statement by Vygotsky to the following by 
Dewey: 
that the fruit of communication should be 
participation, sharing, is a wonder by the natural 
events are subject to reconsideration and revision; 
they are re-adapted to meet the requirement of 
conversation, whether it be public discourse or the 
preliminary discourse termed thinking (Dewey, 1925/ 
1981, p. 132). 
Dewey's phrase "preliminary discourse termed thinking" and 
Vygotsky's "internal speech" match up nicely. In their 
introduction, Newman, Griffin, and Cole (1989) announced 
that they are in agreement with Herbert Simon's 
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characterization of the mind as an artifact rather than as a 
"natural" system. At first it might seem that a 
construction of mind as an artifact rather than a natural 
system breaks the continuity between mind and organic-
physical nature. To restore continuity requires only that 
we appreciate the role of artifacts that is, tools in the 
emergence of mind. Dewey (1925/1981) wrote, 
But at every point appliances and application, utensils 
and uses, are bound up with directions, suggestions and 
records made possible by speech; what has been said 
about the role of tools is subject to a condition 
supplied by language, the tool of tools (p. 134). 
We ourselves are the product, the artifact, the 
construction of cultural labor aided by tools especially, 
the tool of tools. The labor of language, "the cherishing 
mother of all significance" gives birth to our minds and our 
selves. It should come as no surprise that Dewey (1925/ 
1981) , influenced by Mead, saw "the self as the tool of 
tools, the means in all use of means" (p. 189). Vygotsky 
saw the zone of proximal development (ZPD) as a tool. 
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Vygotsky (1978) wrote, "The zone of proximal development 
furnishes psychologists and educators with a tool through 
which the internal course of development can be understood" 
(p. 87). The ZPD is a social tool for the construction of 
meaning between A and B, between "two selves involved in a 
conjoint or shared understanding" and the establishment of 
communicative cooperation in coordinated partnership. How 
we comprehend communication within what Newman, Griffin, and 
Cole (1989) call the construction zone is crucial to issues 
of cultural and, inseparably, personal reproduction, 
progress, freedom, and creativity. For many 
constructivists, these issues focus on the question of 
direction. They ask whether an activity is unidirectional, 
such that students are simply led to a mastery of pre-
existing cultural tools, or whether it is a bi-directional 
creative space, in which both participants learn and 
cultural tools can be reconstructed. Wertsch (1991) calls 
attention to the bias toward unidirectionality that is, 
following Reddy (1979), "the univocal" found in the subtle 
but pervasive "conduit metaphor" for communication. Reddy 
outlines the structure and function of the metaphor as 
follows: (1) language functions like a conduit, 
transferring [psychic] thoughts bodily from one person to 
another; (2) in writing and speaking people insert their 
thoughts or feeling in the words; (3) words accomplish the 
transfer by containing the thoughts or feelings and 
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conveying them to others; and (4) in listening or reading, 
people extract the thoughts and feelings once again from the 
words (p. 290). Wertsch (1991) points out that the overall 
idea of the conduit metaphor is that "human communication 
can be conceptualized in terms of transmission of 
information" (p. 71) . 
For Dewey, logical objects are merely tools. Their 
ultimate realization is in linguistic dialogue or 
cooperative discourse involving "the tool of tools". For 
Dewey, rational persons and societies were dialogical. The 
transmission model of communication maps a monological 
soliloquy and breaks what is really a dialogical and 
interpretive hermeneutic circle. This observation has 
important consequences for our understanding of the ZPD. 
Lave and Wenger (1991) discuss three interpretations of the 
ZPD. We will consider only the last one. Lave and Wenger 
call their last interpretation of the ZPD a collectivist or 
societal perspective. They draw their inspiration for this 
perspective from Yrjo Engestrom (1987), who redefined the 
ZPD as the 
distance between the everyday actions of individuals 
and the historically new form of the societal activity 
that can be collectively generated as a solution to the 
double bind potentially embedded in ... everyday 
actions (p. 174). 
The "double bind" manifests the tension between the need of 
the students to appropriate historically entrenched tools 
that empower them as social actors and the simultaneous need 
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of the culture to retool and recreate itself. Sometimes, as 
those that have studied gender, race, and ethnicity have 
noted, the historically entrenched tools of a culture may 
actually be instruments of power, control, and domination. 
That is why debates over curriculum can be so bitter. Lave 
and Wenger (1991) try to cope with the double bind by 
placing "more emphasis on connecting issues of sociocultural 
transformation with the changing relations between newcomers 
and old-timers in the context of a changing shared 
practice." For Lave and Wenger, the double bind leads to an 
inescapable paradox that they describe as follows: The 
different ways in which old-timers and newcomers establish 
and maintain identities conflict and generate competing 
viewpoints on the practice and its development. Newcomers 
are caught in a dilemma. On the one hand, they need to 
engage in the existing practice, which has developed over 
time: to understand it, to participate in it, and to become 
full members of the community in which it exists. On the 
other hand, they have a stake in its development as they 
begin to establish their own identity in its future (p. 
115) . To exemplify these generalizations, think about what 
happens between students and professors in schools or 
between first-year teachers and their mentors. The double 
bind is less of a problem for some societies than for 
others. Dewey brings this point home in a way that has some 
surprising consequences. Dewey (1916/1980) in one of his 
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books titled, The Democratic Conception in Education, 
indicated that, 
To say that education is a social function securing 
direction and development in the immature through their 
participation in the life of the group to which they 
belong is to say in effect that education will vary 
with the quality of life which prevails in a group (p. 
87) . 
If we take the ZPD as a zone of sociolinguistically 
constructed meaning, then the quality of participation in 
the communal life of the zone should be of pre-eminent 
interest to educational researchers and practitioners. I 
also believe that if we apply Dewey's two standards of ideal 
community life to the zone of proximal development with its 
paradoxes and double bind, we will soon see that, if it is 
to serve as a fit cultural tool for education in a society 
that not only seeks to preserve but to improve itself, then 
the construction of that zone must be democratic. Dewey 
(1916/1980) defined democracy in terms of dialogue and 
communication when he stated: "A democracy is more than a 
form of government; it is primarily a mode of associated 
living, of conjoint communicated experience" (p. 93). 
Looking at his dialogical understanding of logic, it should 
be evident that Dewey considered democracy the most logical 
tool for governing social relations, whatever their binding 
and paradoxical tensions. If we bring these definitions of 
logic and democracy together with Dewey's social behaviorist 
theory of meaning, we can appreciate the depth of what might 
be called Dewey's solution to the paradox of the zone of 
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proximal development. Dewey (1916/1980) declared: 
Not only is social life identical with communication, 
but all communication ... is educative. To be a 
recipient of a communication is to have an enlarged and 
changed experience. One shares in what another has 
thought and felt ... has his own attitude modified. 
Nor is the one who communicates left unaffected. Try 
the experiment of communicating, with fullness and 
accuracy, some experience to another, ... and you will 
find your own attitude toward your experience 
changing ... The experience has to be formulated in 
order to be communicated. To formulate requires 
getting outside of it, seeing it as another would see 
it, considering what points of contact it has with the 
life of another so that it may be got into such form 
that he can appreciate its meaning (pp. 8-9). 
Dewey reminds us that when communication occurs, all natural 
events are subject to reconsideration and revision and that 
the fruit of communication should be participation. Bruner 
(1986) stated that most of our encounters with the world are 
not, as we have seen, direct encounters. Our direct 
experiences are assigned for interpretation to ideas about 
cause and effect, and the world that emerges for us is a 
conceptual world. When we are perplexed about what we 
encounter, we renegotiate its meaning in a manner that is 
concordant with what those around us believe. And the tool 
for negotiation is language. Dewey's view of language as 
communication in cooperative and coordinated partnership in 
the construction of all meaning is at the core of his entire 
philosophy. Dewey (1925/1981) stated: "Through speech a 
person dramatically identifies himself with potential acts 
and deeds; he plays many roles, not in successive stages of 
life but in a contemporaneously enacted drama. Thus mind 
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emerges." For Deweyans, individual minds emerge without 
discontinuity when natural organisms having that capacity 
learn to participate in social activities involving labor, 
tools, and, above all, language. It creates possibilities. 
Language also transforms the way children use technical 
tools. It reorganizes and controls their behavior with 
these objects, thus permitting new forms of problem solving. 
Bruner (1986) noted that the realities of the society 
and of social life are themselves most often products of 
linguistic uses represented in such speech acts as 
promising, abjuring, legitimizing christening, and so on. 
Freire (1989) stated that when one held the belief that a 
culture itself comprises an ambiguous text that is 
constantly in need of interpretation by those who 
participate in it, then the constitutive role of language in 
creating social reality becomes a topic of practical 
concern. Yes, indeed, there is practical concern as Freire 
(1989) pointed out, that if these ideas become models, that 
is if they are applied creatively to reality, then we would 
run the risk of regarding them as reality. Concrete reality 
has to be made to fit in with our ideas and not the other 
way round. And if this happens we would lapse into what he 
called "popular Hegelianism" the belief that the idea is 
reality, and that reality is nothing more than the 
development of the idea by means of concepts. Therefore in 
order to explain the discrepancy between ideas and reality, 
to explain why concepts and concrete reality fail to 
coincide, to explain people's failure to understand and 
change historical reality, it is firmly maintained that it 
is reality that is wrong and not our ideas or system of 
ideas (p. 29). 
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I believe that Bruner (1986) is in agreement with 
Freire here when he posits the question: "where is the 
meaning of social concepts in the world, in the meaner's 
head, or in interpersonal negotiation?" He stated that one 
is compelled to answer that it is the latter. That meaning 
is what we can agree upon or at least accept as a working 
basis for seeking agreement about the concept at hand. If 
one is arguing about social realities like democracy or 
equity or even gross national product, the reality is not 
the thing, not in the head, but in the act of arguing and 
negotiating about the meaning of such concepts. Social 
realities therefore are not stones that we trip over when we 
kick at them, but the meanings that we achieve by the 
sharing of human cognitions. The question is how do we 
relate our ideas and values to our own actions? I share the 
view with Freire (1989) who held that everything we affirm 
and defend, both psychological and at the philosophical and 
religious level must find expression in relevant action. 
When we as individuals do not reflect on our daily lives, we 
do not become aware that there is a gap between these ideas 
and values and the acts we perform in our daily lives. 
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While we affirm certain values at the intellectual level, 
these values are empty if they are removed from our cultural 
life, from our relationship with one another, from our 
friends and the people we meet in the street, and from those 
whom we do not know, but with whom we have a relationship. 
All these ideas of personal, communal and moral values 
which should govern our relations with things and persons 
are no doubt very beautiful ideas; but, to the extent that 
we do not reflect on them and try to ensure that they and 
our actions coincide, there continues to be a gap among what 
we think and the values we affirm and the acts we perform 
with regard to things and persons. Language is the medium 
by which we make these affirmations a reality. We 
communicate in order to share ourselves with others. 
Language is our medium of exchange for sharing our internal 
states of being with one another. Through language we share 
with others our experiences with that reality. According to 
Samovar and Porter (1991), language is not simply a means of 
reporting experience. They suggest that it is also a way of 
defining experience. Different languages represent 
different social realities. Thus, to understand what is 
being said, we must also understand the social context of 
the language itself. Language goes beyond the simple 
understanding of one another. It helps us to understand 
culture itself. Language itself represents culture. Each 
language provides us with a means to perceive the world and 
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a means to interpret experiences. According to Bruner 
(1986), language serves the double function of being both a 
mode of communication and a medium for representing the 
world about which it is communicating. How one talks comes 
eventually to be how one represents what one talks about. 
The stance and the negotiation over stance, by the same 
token, become features of the world toward which one is 
taking stances. And in time, as one develops a sense of 
one's self, the same pattern works its way into the manner 
in which we interpret that text which is our reading of 
ourselves. 
Language therefore not only transmits, it creates or 
constitutes knowledge or reality. Part of that reality is 
the stance which language implies toward knowledge and 
reflection, and the generalized set of stances one 
negotiates creates in time a sense of one's self. Culture 
provides children with tools and other resources that 
motivate the particular form of development they require to 
live in the world. Tools help children to think and to 
express their thoughts to others. Language is a raiser of 
consciousness. In one of his major works, Thought and 
Language, Vygotsky saw language as an agent for altering the 
powers of thought, gives thought new means for explaining 
the world. In turn, language became the repository for new 
thoughts once achieved. 
Another interesting theorist in psychology whose view 
56 
on language needs consideration is Freud (1963). Freud saw 
language as the "talking cure." Language was for him a 
battleground on which warring impulses fought for their 
claims. Dreams, too were conceived as a language, which if 
read correctly revealed the patient's hidden agenda. So 
Freud's interest in language, for all his own sensitivities 
as a gifted writer and reader, was principally in its power 
to express the archaic and the repressed. Freud, too, saw 
language, whether spoken by patients on the couch or by the 
person in the street, as an expression of an inner life that 
had stabilized into neurosis or character. That was why 
language for him was both the vehicle for diagnosis and the 
medium for cure. For Piaget, language reflects thought and 
does not determine it in any sense. That the internal logic 
of thought is expressed in language has no effect on the 
logic itself. The logic of concrete operations or of later 
formal systems are what he called "structures d'ensemble" on 
their own, unaffected by the language in which they are 
expressed. Each view, then expresses a cultural posture. 
Freud's view expresses his liberationism through a 
conventional language by free association. Piaget's 
expresses his faith in the inherent logic of thought and 
subordinates language to it. Vygotsky's gives language both 
a cultural past and a generative present, and assigns it a 
role as the tool and tutor of thought. 
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Methodology 
Vygotsky, I would say, is committed to a theoretical 
position distinct from those of his influential 
contemporaries, Thorndike, Piaget, and Kaffka. However he 
constantly returns to them in order to enrich and sharpen 
his own mind. While Vygotsky focused upon the historically 
shaped and culturally transmitted psychology of human beings 
his contemporaries were involved with the issue of 
development. His concepts differ from those of the early 
behaviorists. Vygotsky (1978) wrote: 
In spite of the significant advances attributable to 
methodology, that method nevertheless is seriously 
limited. The psychologist's most vital challenge is 
that of uncovering and bringing to light the hidden 
mechanisms underlying complex human psychology. Though 
the behaviorist method is objective and adequate to the 
study of simple flexive acts, it clearly fails when 
applied to the study of complex psychological 
processes. The inner mechanisms characteristic of 
these processes remain hidden. The naturalistic 
approach to behavior in general does not take into 
account the qualitative difference between human 
history and that of animals. The experimental 
ramification of this kind of analysis is that human 
behavior is studied without regard to the general 
history of human development (p. 122). 
In contrast, Vygotsky focused on a theoretical approach, a 
methodology, that telescopes change. He emphasizes the 
activeness of humans, vigorous participants in their own 
existence and that at each stage of development children 
acquire the means by which they can competently affect their 
world and themselves. Beginning from childhood the 
distinctive aspect of human mastery is the creation and use 
of auxiliary stimuli. These auxiliary stimuli created by 
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humans have no inherent relation to the existing situation; 
rather, humans introduce them as a means of active 
adaptation. Vygotsky views auxiliary stimuli as highly 
diverse. They include the tools of the culture into which 
the child is born, the language of those who relate to the 
child, and the ingenious means produced by the child 
himself, including the use of his own body. One of the 
striking examples of this sort of tool use can be seen in 
the play activity of poor children who do not have access to 
prefabricated toys but who, nevertheless, are able to play 
house, train, and so on with whatever resources that are 
available to their disposal. 
Piaget (1952) shares Vygotsky's view of active 
organism. They share as well the ability to observe 
children astutely. However, Vygotsky's skills of observation 
were enriched by his knowledge of dialectical materialism 
and his view of the human organism as highly plastic and of 
the environment as historically and culturally shifting 
contexts into which children are born and which they, too, 
will eventually change. Piaget, on the other hand, stresses 
biologically supported, universal stages of development. 
Vygotsky's emphasis is on the interaction between changing 
social conditions and the biological substrata of behavior. 
He held that 
in order to study development in children, one must 
begin with an understanding of the dialectical unity of 
two principally different lines [the biological and the 
cultural], to adequately study this process, then, an 
experimenter must study both components and the laws 
which govern their interplacement at each stage of a 
child's development (Vygotsky, 1978, p. 123). 
Vygotsky (1978) recognized, as had others before him, 
that functional systems are rooted in the most basic 
adaptive responses of the organism, such as unconditioned 
and conditioned reflexes. His theoretical contribution is 
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based on his description of the relation among these diverse 
processes: 
They are characterized by a new integration and co-
relation of their parts. The whole and its parts 
develop parallel to each other and together. We shall 
call the first structures elementary; they are 
psychological wholes, conditioned chiefly by biological 
determinants. The latter structures which emerge in 
the process of cultural development are called higher 
structures .... The initial stage is followed by that 
first structure's destruction, reconstruction, and 
transition to structures of the higher type. Unlike 
the direct, reactive processes, these latter structures 
are constructed on the basis of the use of signs and 
tools; these new formations unite both the direct and 
indirect means of adaptation (p. 124). 
Vygotsky contended that in the course of development 
psychological systems arise which unite separate functions 
into new combinations and complexes. In his theory the most 
fundamental characteristic of developmental change is the 
manner in which previously separate and elementary functions 
are integrated into new functional learning systems: 
"Higher psychological functions are not superimposed as a 
second story over the elementary processes; they represent 
new psychological system" (p. 124). These systems he 
pointed out are changeable and are optimally adaptive to the 
particular tasks confronting the child as well as to the 
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child's stage of development. He stated that even though it 
may seem that children are learning in a purely external 
manner, that is, mastering new skills, the learning of any 
new operation is in fact the result of, and dependent on, a 
child's process of development. Vygotsky (1979) postulates 
that because the historical conditions which determine the 
opportunities for human experience are constantly changing, 
there can be no universal schema that adequately represents 
the dynamic relation between internal and external aspects 
of development. Therefore, a functional learning system of 
one child may not be identical to that of another, though 
there may be similarities at certain stages of development. 
This analysis is different from that of Piaget, who 
describes universal stages that are identical for all 
children as a function of age. 
Vygotsky explores the role of social and cultural 
experiences through an examination of children's play. In 
their play children both depend on and imaginatively 
transform those socially produced objects and forms of 
behavior made available to them in their particular 
environment. Vygotsky (1978) held that "if one changes the 
tools of thinking available to a child, his mind will have a 
radically different structure." With signs children are 
able to internalize the adaptive social means already 
available to them from society at large. For Vygotsky, one 
of the essential aspects of development is the increasing 
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ability of children to control and direct their own 
behavior, a mastery made possible by the development of new 
psychological forms and functions and by the use of signs 
and tools in this process. He indicated that children 
extend the boundaries of their understanding by integrating 
socially elaborated symbols into their own consciousness. 
These symbols are seen in social values and beliefs, the 
cumulative knowledge of their culture, and the 
scientifically expanded concepts of reality. For Vygotsky, 
the most important sign using behavior in children's 
development is human speech. Through speech children free 
themselves of many of the immediate constraints of their 
environment. They prepare themselves for future activity, 
they plan, order, and control their own behavior as well as 
that of others. Speech for him also is an excellent example 
of sign usage which, once internalized, becomes a pervasive 
and profound part of the higher psychological processes; 
speech acts to organize, unify, and integrate many disparate 
aspects of children's behavior, such as perception, memory, 
and problem solving. Many educators, recognizing that the 
rate of learning may vary from child to child, isolate 
particularly slow learners form their teachers as well as 
their peers through the use of programmed and frequently 
mechanized instruction. In contrast, Vygotsky, because he 
views learning as a profoundly social process, emphasizes 
dialogue and the varied roles that language plays in 
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instruction and in mediated cognitive growth. The mere 
exposure of students to new materials through oral lectures 
neither allows for adult guidance nor for collaboration with 
peers. Vygotsky pointed out that to implement the concept 
of the ZPD in instruction, psychologists and educators must 
collaborate in the analysis of the internal developmental 
processes which are stimulated by teaching and which are 
needed for subsequent learning. In this theory, then 
teaching represents the means through which development is 
advanced; that is, the socially elaborated contents of human 
knowledge and the cognitive strategies necessary for their 
internalization are evoked in the learners according to 
their actual developmental levels. Vygotsky (1978) 
criticizes educational intervention that lags behind 
developed psychological processes instead of focusing upon 
emerging functions and capabilities. A particularly 
imaginative application of these principles are Paolo 
Freire's literacy campaigns in Third World countries. 
Because he adapted his educational methods to the specific 
historical and cultural setting in which his students lived, 
they were able to combine their spontaneous concepts that 
is, those based on social practice with those introduced by 
teachers in instructional settings. 
CHAPTER III 
CRITICAL THINKING/PEDAGOGY 
For the last two decades there has emerged an 
impressive array of ideas aimed at redefining and 
reexamining the meaning of radical educational reform. With 
this has come a renewed interest in the development and 
application of Marxism, Critical Theory, Phenomenology, 
Critical Sociology, and the Sociology of Knowledge within 
the area of radical educational change. Yet in spite of 
this, some radicals appear confused and in disagreement over 
the question of what constitutes radical educational theory 
and practice. Beneath the excess of pedagogical approaches, 
that range from deschooling to alternative schools, one 
searches in vain for a comprehensive Critical Theory of 
Education which bridges the gap between Educational Theory 
on the one hand and Social and Political Theory on the 
other. One also searches in vain for a systematic 
theoretical approach to a radical analysis of the day-by-day 
socio-political texture of classroom structure and 
interaction, that is, how specific reforms of knowledge and 
meaning penetrate, develop, and are transmitted within the 
context of the classroom experience. 
I will analyze the major tendencies that have dominated 
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radical educational movements of the last two decades. From 
this I will attempt to formulate a critique of these 
tendencies and to move tentatively toward a critical theory 
of radical pedagogy. Later I will give some general 
approaches which might be useful in implementing radical 
educational reform. 
In the theoretical disorder evident in the work of the 
educational left, two major positions stand out prominently 
(Giroux, 1981) . On the one hand, are the content-focused 
radicals, and on the other hand, are the strategy-based 
radicals. These representations are, of course, 
ideal-typical and should not be seen as exhibiting rigid 
boundaries. It is clear that many educators fall between 
these ideal-types. This should not obscure the fact that 
few radical educators have provided a theoretical 
perspective that equally acknowledges and integrates both 
positions. The content-focused radicals define radical 
pedagogy by their insistence on the use of a Marxist based 
perspective to provide a demystifying analysis for students 
of the dominant ideology reproduced in varied forms in the 
prevailing system of schooling. On the other hand, 
strategy-based radical education defines radical pedagogy as 
the development of healthy, non-alienating classroom social 
relationships (Rappaport, 1978; Weber & Somers, 1973). In 
this case, specific classroom social encounters are designed 
to help students break through the engineered boredom and 
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oppression characteristic of late capitalist relations of 
production and its everyday life. Both groups have made 
significant gains in furthering radical educational reform, 
although each ends up with a limited pedagogical model that 
fails to integrate theory and process, content and 
methodology. Moreover, beyond their differences, both 
groups share perspectives which not only reveal theoretical 
gaps, but also provide theoretical building blocks for a 
more integrated form of radical pedagogy. As such, both 
positions warrant further examination. 
Giroux (1981) points out that the cornerstone of the 
content-focussed radical position lies in its stress on the 
relationship between the economic and political structures 
of capitalism and the ideological superstructures, of which 
schools occupy a paramount position. He said according to 
this group, schools deepen social and economic domination by 
functioning as agents of legitimation. As a result, schools 
help to mediate the contradictions between the ruling-class 
and the oppressed by fostering a collective consciousness 
reared on 'myths' and steeped in the 'virtues' of passivity, 
docility, and unquestioning obedience (p. 64). This group 
also raises fundamental questions about how institutionally 
selected and sanctioned knowledge is used to confer cultural 
legitimacy on dominant belief and value systems. Young 
(1976) in response to this question points out the focus of 
this group when he says: 
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... to tackle the dialectical relationship between 
access to power and the opportunity to legitimize 
certain dominant categories and processes by which the 
availability of such categories to some groups enables 
them to assert power and control over others (p. 8). 
Looking at it from classroom pedagogical practice, this 
view of knowledge undermines the positivist teaching 
practices which presently are seen in American education, 
particularly in elementary and secondary education. 
Aronowitz (1977) stated that the content-focussed radicals 
have encouraged students to move beyond the anti-
theoretical, fragmented, skill-oriented modes of pedagogy 
that have become embedded in American schools. As a result, 
a small but significant number of radical teachers have 
helped their students to recognize the ideological basis of 
the division of knowledge characteristic of most school 
curricula and to view knowledge as more than a 'neutral 
picturing of fact' (Freire, 1987). It is interesting to 
note that these radical groups have helped to expose the 
prevailing belief that traditional pedagogy represents a 
better mode of learning; rather they have exposed its 
functional underside. 
According to Giroux (1981), the strategy-based view 
springs from a long tradition of thought including such 
people as Rousseau, Wilhelm Reich, Neil, Carl Rogers and E. 
Fromm. This group he says acknowledges the oppressive power 
and control exercised by school, but they differ from the 
content-focussed radicals in their assessment of the nature 
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of such control. According to Giroux the strategy-based 
radicals view schooling as a reproduction of traditional, 
hierarchical, social relationships. In essence these 
relationships replicate top-to-bottom models of authority 
and sanction social conformity rather than student 
initiative and imagination. He points out that the 
strategy-based radicals have the view that the process of 
schooling inculcates in students a form of domination that 
is deeply felt, lived, and experienced as part of one's own 
history and self formation. Horkheimer and Adorno (1972) 
point out that the theoretical belief of this group is that 
industrial society is established not only in men's minds 
but in their personalities and character structures as well. 
Giroux in reference to Spring (1975) points that implicit in 
this view is a perception of domination and control which 
involves unconscious as well as conscious dimensions of the 
personality. Spring also points out that this group not 
only questioned the manipulation of knowledge of students 
but also questioned the political meaning of traditional 
classroom pedagogical structures. The strategy-based 
radicals pedagogical methodology is focussed in developing 
classroom social relations where students experience 
classroom encounters and are able to redeem their own 
subjectivity, and their psychic freedom. 
Almost 20 years ago, Bernstein (1977) pointed out that 
a critical understanding of the complex interplay that 
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exists between pedagogy, ideology, and social change is 
absent from both of these perspectives. Neither view has 
yet developed a theory of liberation that could provide a 
foundation for educational theory and practice in the most 
radical sense. Instead, each of these views supports forms 
of pedagogy that are both reductionistic and incomplete. 
Both forms of pedagogy end up objectifying and in some cases 
depoliticizing, though in different ways, the very people 
they intend to liberate. It is only recently that these 
versions have been challenged and criticized. The one who 
has best addressed this challenge is Paulo Freire (1987) . 
Paulo Freire, the Brazilian educator once in exile 
because of his literacy campaign, was considered a threat to 
the old order. He later worked with the World Council of 
Churches in Geneva. He stands out as an educator who has 
helped to bridge and bypass those divisions of pedagogy that 
characterized much of what passes as radical education. His 
work in Brazil and Africa exemplified a pedagogy that, in 
the best tradition of radical praxis, unites theory and 
practice. Shaull (1993) pointed out that Freire is able to 
do this because he operates on one basic assumption: 
... that man's ontological vocation (as he calls it) is 
to be a Subject who acts upon and transforms his world, 
and in so doing moves toward ever new possibilities of 
fuller and richer life individually and collectively. 
This world to which he relates is not a static and 
closed order, a given reality which man must accept and 
to which he must adjust; rather, it is a problem to be 
worked on and solved. It is the material used by man to 
create history, a task which he performs as he 
overcomes that which is dehumanizing at any particular 
time and place and dares to create the qualitatively 
new (p. 14) . 
Freire himself represents a concrete embodiment of his own 
call for such a unity. Freire's publication in English of 
the Pedagogy of the Oppressed (1995) and Education for 
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Critical Consciousness (1993) has made him a cult-hero among 
a minority of Western liberals and radicals since his exile 
from Brazil in 1964. Boston (1977) pointed out that Freire 
like other major thinkers has not always been followed by a 
clear understanding or rightful application of his ideas. 
One reason might be the difficulty of Freire's writing 
style, which some critics claim is not only obtuse, but also 
at odds with his claim to a demythologizing humanism. I 
would posit a more arguable reason: that Freire's pedagogy 
has been developed and used in Third World countries that 
bear little resemblance to the advanced industrial countries 
of the West. There is no question that Freire's pedagogy 
has its share of over-simplifications and theoretical 
weaknesses. But more importantly, embedded within it, it 
contains several concepts and theoretical insights that 
provide the fundamental building blocks for a radical 
pedagogy applicable to the Western experience. For example, 
Freire (1987) believes in critical dialogue as an 
instructional method in human development. His techniques 
and ideas extend beyond teaching and communication into 
human and social development which is common to the West. 
To him, dialogue 
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must be understood as something taking part in the very 
historical nature of human beings. It is part of our 
historical process in becoming human beings ... to the 
extent that humans have become more and more critically 
communicative beings. Dialogue is a moment where 
humans meet to reflect on their reality as they make 
and remake it (pp. 98-99). 
Freire's theoretical roots bear little resemblance to 
those of his colleagues in the West. Instead of relying 
heavily upon the Positivist Tradition that pervades the 
social sciences in the West, he has developed his 
educational theory and practice form a variety of radical 
sources drawn from History, Philosophy, Sociology, 
Phenomenology, Existentialism, and Nee-Marxism. Freire is 
deeply indebted to Marx, Huserl, Buber, and Sartre, among 
others, for his intellectual heritage. At the center of his 
pedagogy is a dialectical understanding of the connections 
between school and the larger universe of socio-political 
meanings and beliefs that legitimate the dominant society. 
According to Giroux (1981), Freire is not a structuralist 
with the intent of propping up a functional sociology and 
barren form of Pedagogical Behaviorism that denies 
subjectivity. Instead, he acknowledges the false 
ideological distinctions between public and private and 
searches for the objective forces that shape the individual 
and collective consciousness of the oppressed. Giroux 
points out that Freire capitalized upon Marx's critique of 
ideology and Freud's psychoanalytical model, in his attempt 
to examine the nature of domination within specific socio-
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historical conditions. Freire, Giroux says, is conscious of 
how individual and collective consciousness can be an 
emancipatory force engaged in the shaping of history. 
Freire rejects the notion that domination is an exclusively 
private affair and looks at the multifaceted ways in which 
schooling functions to structure and shape the subjective 
perceptions and identities of the oppressed. According to 
Giroux, for Freire all pedagogy in essence is a political 
issue and all educational theories are political theories. 
Freire's work, Giroux concludes, represents a critical 
attempt to illustrate how ideologies of various means and 
persuasions reflect, distort, and prevent men and women from 
becoming socio-political actors in the struggle against an 
oppressive society. In essence to understand his pedagogy 
one must begin with a recognition that it is both a call for 
liberation and an ongoing process of radical reconstruction 
(p. 129). 
Schooling and Culture 
Freire postulates that schooling is not neutral. He 
stresses that the so called neutrality of schooling is in 
itself nothing less than a mystification, a convenient way 
of hiding the political function of schooling. Freire does 
not join with various mechanistic Marxists who see the 
school as a mere conveyor belt that processes students into 
the alienating realms of leisure and work. Freire rejects 
this deterministic model of pedagogy and views the process 
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of schooling in more complex terms. Thus, he not only helps 
us to focus on schooling as a process designed to reproduce 
and legitimate the prevailing dominant consciousness in the 
existing culture, he also points to the contradictions and 
problems that accompany that process. For example, Freire 
(1993) emphasized problem-posing as opposed to "banking" as 
a democratic way for students to take part in the contention 
over knowledge and the shape of society. He writes: 
Problem-posing education affirms men as beings in the 
process of becoming-as unfinished, uncompleted beings 
in and with a likewise unfinished reality .... The 
banking method emphasizes permanence and becomes 
reactionary; problem-posing education-which accepts 
neither a "well-behaved" present nor a predetermined 
future-roots itself in the dynamic present and becomes 
revolutionary .... Whereas the banking method directly 
or indirectly reinforces men's fatalistic perception of 
their situation, the problem-posing method presents 
this very situation to them as a problem (p. 65). 
Freire is of the view that meaning can be constructed by 
actors whose perceptions do not always conform to the 
perceptions of the oppressed. This confirms the view that 
knowledge reflects the values and interests of the creators. 
Like Pierre Bourdieu (1977), Freire sees culture as doing 
more than passing on the heritage of a given country. 
Culture for him is not an all embracing neutral category of 
social science, rather it is a dependent but nevertheless 
special sphere within the social process as a whole and its 
function is political in essence. Dreitzel (1977) puts it 
this way: 
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The dominant culture functions to legitimize existing 
modes of social relations and production. It also 
functions to provide the motivational structures that 
links individual needs with social needs and, finally, 
culture provides a society with the symbolic language 
for interpreting the boundaries of individual and 
social existence (pp. 83-129). 
The correlation between culture and education is a crucial 
theme in Freire's work and represents a powerful critique of 
the Positivist approach to schooling that prevails in the 
West. Freire enabled us to understand that only by viewing 
schooling as a semi-successful agency of legitimation within 
the context of larger socio-economic forces can one begin to 
understand the source of the problems and contradictions 
that in large part plague schools. The prevailing forms of 
knowledge, values, social relationships and forms of 
evaluation that are used in schools do not exist in 
isolation from the larger society. They are linked, for the 
most part, either directly or indirectly, to the prevailing 
cultural hegemony and dominant economic arrangements. 
Another theme in Freire's work that is useful to radical 
educators in the West is his theory of knowledge, 
particularly its relationship to the concepts of domination 
and emancipation. 
Theory of Knowledge 
When we conceptualize Freire's concept of schooling 
seen in political and ideological choices, liberation then 
becomes more than a matter of technique. The issue embedded 
in Freire's notion of liberation is that people should be 
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able to generate their own meanings and frames of reference. 
They should also be able to develop their self determining 
powers through their ability to perform a critical reading 
of reality. In upholding their own reality they can act on 
that reality. Freire (1978) made this clear in his literacy 
campaign inaugurated in Guinea Bissau: 
The act of learning to read and write, in this 
instance, is a creative act that involves a critical 
comprehension of reality. The knowledge of earlier 
knowledge, gained by the learners as a result of 
analyzing praxis in its social context opens to them 
the possibility of new knowledge. The new knowledge 
goes far beyond the limits of earlier knowledge and 
reveals the reason for being behind the facts, thus 
demythologizing the false interpretations of these same 
facts. And so, there is now no more separation between 
thought-language and objective reality. The reading of 
a text now demands a 'reading' within the social 
context to which it refers (p. 24). 
Knowledge according to Freire is not neutral. For him it 
should be regarded not as the acquisition of a body of 
information, but as the result of a human activity situated 
in human norms and interests. Just as there is a 
distribution of economic capital in society, there is also a 
distribution of cultural capital, of which knowledge is a 
crucial part (Giroux, 1981) . 
The issue here is to recognize that the act of knowing 
is more than a technical issue, it is, in part a political 
issue. For him, knowing is not a matter of the best way to 
learn a given body of knowledge, but a theoretical practical 
issue designed to distinguish between essence and accident 
(appearance), truth and falsehood. Knowledge, under the 
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guise of objectivity, has long been used to legitimate 
belief value systems that are at the core of bondage. That 
'objective' knowledge not only mystifies, but it also turns 
people into spectators by removing from public debate the 
norms, values and interests underlying it. Reality for 
Freire is nothing other than that which is codified in the 
established language and facts. Liberation begins with the 
recognition that knowledge at its roots, is ideological and 
political, inextricably tied to human interests and norms. 
And that the correlation between knowledge and human 
interest should be viewed as the theoretical foundation or 
beginning for going beyond what Nietzsche called the "dogma 
of the immaculate perception" (Giroux, 1981) . 
The core of Freire's notion of knowledge is a 
recognition of the dialectical interconnections between the 
doer, receiver, and the objective world itself. Herbert 
Marcuse (1960) puts it this way: 
Dialectical thought invalidates the 'a priori' 
opposition of value and fact by understanding all facts 
as stages of a single process- a process in which 
subject-object are so joined that truth can be 
determined only within the subject-object totality. 
All facts embody the knower as well as the doer; they 
continuously translate the past into the present. The 
objects thus contain subjectivity in their very 
structure (p. viii). 
Knowledge for Freire is more than a social construct, it 
also represents the basis for social action. A radical 
conception of knowledge does not rest simply on the ability 
to demystify the ideological hegemony of the dominant order. 
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That is important, but incomplete. A radical conception of 
knowledge also rests on how well it can be used by the 
oppressed themselves to question the very processes used to 
constitute and legitimate knowledge and experience in the 
first place. Knowledge that is divorced from the processes 
that constitute it represents not only a crude pedagogical 
simplification, but a reactionary political act that creates 
a division of labor that prevents radical educational 
reflection. Freire's concept of knowledge as a liberating 
tool easily speaks to a number of ways in which such a 
concept could be employed to enrich radical educational 
theory and practice in the West. 
Freire sees the core of the act of knowing as both a 
questioning attitude and a specific set of social 
relationships. Freire (1978) stated: 
On one level, knowing demands understanding 
dialectically ... the different forms in which human 
beings know their relations with the world ... knowing 
demands the curious presence of subjects confronted 
with the world. On another level, knowing means looking 
at knowledge from a perspective that enables men and 
women to transcend the realms of intellectual habit and 
common sense. Only then can the oppressed recognize 
the ideological distortions that influence and shape 
their understanding of social and political reality (p. 
132) . 
Freire (1987) urges that radical educators learn to make 
problematic the knowledge they present to their students. 
And that every effort should be made to avoid forms of 
pedagogy and knowledge that provide a Mechanistic and 
Deterministic view of the world. In essence this means that 
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all educational experience must begin with questions 
concerning the meaning and nature of knowledge itself. 
Freire (1978) pointed out by citing an example that the 
relationship between knowledge and ideology could be pursued 
through such questions as: 
Whose reality is being legitimated with this 
knowledge?; why this knowledge in the first place?; 
whose interests does this knowledge represent?; why is 
it being taught this way?; does this knowledge have 
meaning for the learner? and is this knowledge part of 
the learner's cultural capital? (p. 101). 
Freire also pointed out that educators must constantly 
survey different avenues to help the learner view knowledge 
as problematic. Any radical theory of knowledge must 
emphasize the processes by which we learn to know, and the 
methods by which we constitute meaning. Like Ludwig 
Wittgenstein (1953), he is convinced that how we come to 
know presupposes intersubjective agreements and standards 
and that knowing is shaped and influenced by specific forms 
of intentionality and intersubjective norms which cannot be 
separated neatly from social relations. Freire (1978) 
focuses on the essence of the issue with his claim that "the 
knowledge of how to define what needs to be known cannot be 
separated from the why of knowing ... the practice of 
thinking about practice is the best way to think correctly." 
There can be no denial of what Freire concluded. I will 
endorse it by saying that we educators need to develop a 
pedagogy designed not only to help student generate their 
own meanings, but also to help them reflect on the process 
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of thinking itself. Questions that teach students how 
specific structures of thought are both used and embodied in 
particular types of World Views, Ideologies, and Experiences 
must be translated into viable pedagogical practices. It is 
then that students will be able to use knowledge as part of 
a self-determining process that helps them to distinguish 
false from true knowledge claims. 
Another aspect of Freire's theory of knowledge centers 
around his view of knowledge as fundamentally linked to the 
question of social relationships. He is of the view that 
knowledge should be defined through the social mediations 
and roles that provide the context for its meaning and its 
mode of distribution. This reflects Vygotsky's view that 
individual intellectual development cannot be understood 
without reference to the social milieu in which the child is 
embedded. This is a central concept in Freire's pedagogy. 
Knowledge becomes the mediator of communication and dialogue 
among learners. Freire (1987) declared: 
Only dialogue, which requires critical thinking, is 
also capable of generating critical thinking. Without 
dialogue there is no communication, and without 
communication there can be no true education. 
Education which is able to resolve the contradiction 
between teacher and student takes place in a situation 
in which both address their act of cognition to the 
object by which they are mediated. Thus, the 
dialogical character of education as the practice of 
freedom does not begin when the teacher-student meets 
with the students-teachers in a pedagogical situation, 
but rather when the former first asks herself or 
himself what she or he will dialogue with the latter 
about. And preoccupation with the content of dialogue 
is really preoccupation with the program content of 
education (pp. 73-74). 
For Freire this means that the mediation of knowledge 
demands classroom social relationships radically different 
from the top-to-bottom models of socialization that 
characterize traditional modes of schooling. 
Theory of Domination 
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Freire gives us a useful synthesis of how the mechanics 
of domination operate within pedagogical settings. To 
illustrate his position he focuses on traditional forms of 
pedagogical theory and practice that have long remained 
unexamined. He focuses his attention on the question of how 
the loyalty and obedience of a population is maintained 
primarily through ideological means. The mechanism that 
performs this according to Freire is within the cultural 
institutions of the dominant elite. This dominant elite 
plays a major role in "brain-washing" the oppressed _with 
myths and beliefs that later have a great impact on their 
psyches and character structure, to the degree that people 
will consent to their own exploitation and powerlessness. 
Freire points out that there is hope that a change in 
individual and collective consciousness within radical 
educational structures will provide the subjective 
preconditions for the basis for radical change. Freire 
views the passivity of the oppressed (students) as social 
and deliberate. The objective conditions of oppression, 
economic and political impoverishment, only provide part of 
the answer in understanding the constitutive nature of 
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oppression. Freire postulates that a more reasonable answer 
to the 'culture of silence' that characterizes the oppressed 
can be found in analyzing the subjective basis of 
oppression. For Freire, domination is not to be found in 
either the subjective realm or the objective conditions of 
oppression, limited either to the realm of consciousness or 
the realm of material exploitation. Rather domination is 
rooted in a subjective-objective dialectic. The point of 
interest in that dialectic, for Freire, is how objective 
Socio-Political forces shape one's subjectivity. The answer 
to this question is the motivating factor for Freire in 
working with the oppressed in understanding and changing the 
Socio-Political reality in which they live. 
The outcome of Freire's notion of changing domination 
is a set of pedagogical practices designed to overcome the 
oppressive conditions in which students find themselves. He 
puts much emphasis in his design for liberation on what he 
terms dialogical communication. For him dialogical 
communication stands for developing pedagogical structures 
in which dialogue and analysis serve as the basis for 
individual and collective possibilities for reflection and 
action. In this way the oppressed: 
see and analyze their own way of being in the world 
of their immediate daily life, including the life of 
their villages, and when they can perceive the 
rationale for the factors on which their daily life is 
based, they are enabled to go far beyond the narrow 
horizons of their own village and of the geographical 
area in which it is located, to gain a global 
perspective on the world (p. 57). 
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Dialogical communication, here is both a theoretical 
and strategic concept for political action. Freire pointed 
out that educators who ignored the cultural capital of the 
oppressed practiced cultural invasion. Freire understood 
and developed the concept of cultural invasion and warned 
strongly against using the methods of the oppressor to teach 
the oppressed. In citing Amilcar Cabral, Freire (1987) held 
that "if the re-Africanization of mentality is to take 
place, radicals would have to begin with the concrete 
reality of the learners and their own experience in this 
reality." It is only under such circumstances that the 
creative power of the people would emerge with the guidance 
rather than domination of radical teachers and leaders. He 
is 0£ the opinion that the reasons for the educational 
failures of minorities of class and color are not to be 
found outside but inside the institutionalized nature of 
schooling. Bourdieu (1977) states that schools generate the 
culture capital of the upper classes and in doing so teach 
the dominated classes to devalue their own culture. Freire 
explained that to fill this gap he emphasizes the need for 
radical educators to develop both content and methodologies 
that are consistent with a progressive political stance. 
Freire extends the notion of radical educational praxis by 
exposing those issues of the 'hidden curriculum' that exist 
in both the selection and distribution of knowledge as well 
as in the use of pedagogical styles designed to transmit 
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that knowledge. 
Giroux (1981} critiqued some of Freire's pedagogical 
ideology. But in order to understand Giroux's critique on 
Freire, we have to review a little of the background of 
Giroux. Giroux's work is a critique of the functionalist 
assumptions of both liberal publicists and radical critics 
of Western Education. He is among the few outstanding 
scholars who have tried to break from the Reductionist 
Ideology. He is neither an Economic Determinist nor an 
Ideological Determinist. When I attended a lecture and 
discussion conducted by Giroux in 1994 at Loyola University 
Chicago, his focus was on how the curriculum functions as an 
internal discourse as well as a powerful force for social 
integration. In effect, what constitutes Giroux's major 
contribution to educational theory is his focus on 
curriculum as a discourse that may either embody the 
elements of domination or liberation. Many psychologists, 
learning theorists and educators have tried to understand 
how people acquire knowledge. Giroux's uniqueness consists 
in the way in which he approaches these issues. Like 
Freire, he probes deeply into the conditions of pedagogy, 
tries to understand how it is possible that education can be 
a force for democracy; not by asserting its influence within 
the social hierarchy but rather as an effort to transmit 
cultural tradition and ideology as the knowledge of 
hegemonic groups in society. For Giroux schools are 
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institutions of cultural and social reproduction that embody 
what Pierre Bourdieu (1977) calls 'Cultural Capital'. Just 
as workers contend with their employers for shares of social 
capital through struggles for higher wages, students and 
teachers wage a constant battle for a portion of society's 
cultural capital through the curriculum and pedagogy. For 
many Americans, Giroux has offered his critique of schooling 
within a framework of making pedagogy an emancipatory 
activity. Like Freire, Giroux wishes to empower students 
and teachers to utilize their critical sensibilities and 
their options for social change. 
Giroux's Critique on Freire 
Giroux (1981) observes that Freire's strength lies in 
his ability to address educational issues as political, 
especially in his strong emphasis on the relationship 
between schooling and the dominant culture. Giroux stated 
that the fact of domination in Third World nations, as well 
as the substantive nature of that domination, is relatively 
clear for Freire. Giroux disagrees only because of the fact 
that what may be justifiable for Third World radicals does 
not necessarily mean it applies to the West. Giroux points 
out that the conditions of domination are not only different 
in the advanced industrial countries of the West, but they 
are less obvious, and in some cases more pervasive and 
powerful. Giroux feels that Freire's visit to the USA in 
the seventies misconstrued the extent and nature of the 
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ideological hegemony that exists in the United States. 
Giroux (1981) in reference to Egerton's (1973) article, 
"Searching for Freire," Saturday Review of Education, stated 
that Freire claimed: "This is one of the most alienated of 
all countries. People know they are exploited and 
dominated, but they feel incapable of breaking down the 
dehumanized wall" (p. 33). Giroux accepts that the 
alienation, exploitation, and domination to which Freire 
refers is certainly an objective fact, but far from a 
subjective perception recognized by most Americans. I 
differ with Giroux's statement because there is no point in 
time when all Americans will see the subjectivity of 
alienation, exploitation and domination in the affairs of 
this country from the same perspective. This perspective 
would have to, in retrospect, that all knowledge reflects 
the value and interest of the creator. There are no 
universal perceptions, and there are no universal answers to 
any issue. The answer in my mind, if there is any in terms 
of subjectivity, has to be discovered in the course of 
discovery of the 'Other' and the importance of taking this 
'Other' as the starting point in order to propose a 
reflection for changing reality, i.e., the reality of 
exploitation, domination and dehumanization which Freire 
talked about. The reflection of these issues will help us 
to accelerate the process of changing reality by considering 
the 'Other's Culture' and recognizing it as different. To 
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make this revision possible I would like to propose a 
theoretical framework which will help to transform our views 
of the 'Other'. That theoretical framework, as I see it, 
will be unity through diversity. Participation is the key 
for any unity to exist and when unity exists, there is 
democracy. When policy is made which takes into 
consideration the participation by the 'Other' as necessary, 
then the creation of unity comes into existence; and there 
is democracy. But when a certain group imposes unity on the 
other by eliminating the cultural differences (the essence 
of their being; that which makes them who they are) then 
subjectivity becomes questionable and is seen as an illusion 
for the 'Other'. 
With respect to the notion of ideology, Giroux points 
out that Freire is not clear about whether he supports a 
definition of ideology derived from Marx, in which ideology 
is seen as a distortion of reality, or if he supports a view 
of ideology similar to one articulated by Louis Althusser 
and Alvin Gouldner. Althusser and Gouldner (1970), 
according to Giroux, do not view ideology as an aberration 
that will disappear in a socialist society, but rather as a 
constitutive medium, different in degrees, in all societies. 
Giroux points out that if Freire is suggesting that the end 
of ideology will come with a classless society, then he may 
be unwittingly supporting a version of the very Positivism 
he insists on criticizing; i.e., ideology in this case is 
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replaced by Science with its concomitant claim to absolute 
truth. Giroux also stated that while Freire provides a 
substantive description of the ideologies he criticizes as 
well as an analysis of the material and psychological forces 
that sustain them, he fails to provide a clear analysis of 
the historical forms of political and social life that 
produced them. Again I hold a different view from Giroux. 
Freire does in fact provide a clear analysis of the 
historical forms of political and social life that produced 
them when Freire (1989) states: 
For environment to become yet richer, mentally, 
physically and emotionally, I think we need to discover 
a different environment. Basically, as you know, as we 
all know, in order to discover ourselves, we need to 
see ourselves in the other, to understand the other in 
order to understand ourselves, to enter into the other 
(p. 14). 
Here I understand that Freire is saying that, to understand 
the dominant culture, we must explore it so as to lay bare 
the complex relationship between knowledge and power and how 
this knowledge and power can help us in our self 
development. I would say that it was coming to know the 
world that helped me to understand and comprehend my own 
country better. One important aspect of my intellectual 
experience was precisely my study here in America that not 
only enabled me to discover, or rediscover what my own 
country Nigeria was really like. That is the positive side 
of it. And I would add that I came to a better 
understanding of the village where I came from and where I 
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was born. Basically, I think that my great university has 
been the small village of Amuzie where I was born and the 
big town Aba where I experienced childhood and adolescence. 
Aba is where my father taught me how to read and write. My 
father who would turn his hand to anything, sometimes 
working as a teacher, sometimes as a businessman exposed me 
to different apprenticeships. Aba and Amuzie were the two 
great universities which were to shape my intellectual life 
to seek for a higher knowledge. It is my discovering 
different environments that has enriched me mentally, 
physically and emotionally as well as providing me the 
material and psychological forces to sustain them. Just as 
I received the gift of life from my mother and father, with 
generosity, devotion and love I can give birth to joy, to 
peace, to service. This has strengthened me in many ways in 
my profession as a priest to respond to those I have come 
across in my journey in the ministry. 
My mother nursed me as an infant. My father nourished 
me that I might grow in strength. Just as they gave life to 
me, so too must I give life to all who need my help. We 
must give birth to joy in our world. We must respond to 
those who need our help. We must care with a spirit both 
genuine and spontaneous. We must love with a power that is 
simple and sincere. We must have an eye for the one who 
needs our special attention. We must be open-hearted and 
kind toward those who look to us and who are different from 
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us. We must remain open to new opportunities and fresh 
needs. We must be tender and gentle even in small matters. 
In my mind there are few limits to our giving and caring. 
In effect I am arguing that Freire did indeed provide a 
clear picture of Political and Social Life which produced 
those ideologies he criticized since those who wear the 
shoes know where they pinch. Those ideologies he has 
experienced he criticized not only in Brazil, his home 
country but also in different parts of the world where this 
inequality and the degradation of human being is active. 
These experiences he exposes to others to help them to 
recreate themselves and their societies. 
Giroux also criticized Freire's work on the notion of 
dialogical communication. Giroux maintained that the 
relationship between communication and action in Freire's 
pedagogy was not always clear. Giroux stated that Freire 
did not specify what are the objective and subjective forces 
of resistance that prevent the transition from radical 
communication to radical action. Giroux (1981) questioned: 
how will the oppressed evaluate their teachers if both 
the limits and possibilities for generating and 
implementing radical discourse cannot be measured 
against a set of socially defined norms which define 
the conditions that support non-repressive 
communication and public discourse? (p. 138). 
I have the opinion that Freire in his pedagogy made it 
clear when he talks about the relationship between 
communication and action. For example he analyzed dialogue 
and what it signifies. The essence of dialogue according to 
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Freire is the word. In the word there are two dimensions, 
reflection and action. If one is sacrificed at the expense 
of the other, both suffer. That means when a word is 
deprived of its dimension of action, reflection 
automatically suffers as well, and the word loses its 
authenticity. It becomes empty and when it becomes empty, 
it cannot transform. And because there is no 
transformation, action becomes impossible. In response to 
Giroux's question on what the objective and subjective 
forces of resistance that prevent the transition from 
radical communication to radical action are, Freire (1993) 
puts those forces of resistance in this form: 
How can I dialogue if I always project ignorance onto 
others and never perceive my own? How can I dialogue 
if I regard myself as a case apart from others mere 
'its' in whom I cannot recognize other 'is'? How can I 
dialogue if I consider myself a member of the in-group 
of 'pure' men, the owners of truth and knowledge, for 
whom all non-members are 'these people' or 'the great 
unwashed'? How can I dialogue if I start from the 
premise that naming the world is the task of an elite 
and that the presence of the people in history is a 
sign of deterioration, thus to be avoided? How can I 
dialogue if I am closed to and even off ended by the 
contribution of others? How can I dialogue if I am 
afraid of being displaced, the mere possibility causing 
me torment and weakness? (p. 71). 
These are the forces of existence in my mind that prevent 
the transition from radical communication to radical action 
from operating. This has resulted in the failure of many 
political and educational plans because their authors 
designed them according to their own personal views of 
reality, not taking into consideration the men and women to 
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whom their program was directed. Someone, according to 
Freire, who cannot acknowledge himself to be as mortal as 
everyone else still has a long way to go before he can reach 
the point of encounter. At the point of encounter there are 
neither utter fools nor perfect sages; there are only people 
who are attempting together to learn more than they know 
now. So Freire sees the forces of resistance preventing 
the transition from radical communication to radical action 
when the dialogue is not built on the virtue of faith, 
humility, and love. 
Faith, according to Freire (1987), is required in 
mankind to make and remake, to create and re-create. Faith 
in people is an 'a priori' requirement for dialogue to 
occur. The man of dialogue must believe in others even 
before he meets them face to face. It is in responding to 
this faith in one another that the power of creation and 
transformation is generated. Without this faith in people, 
dialogue becomes faceless and degenerates into what Freire 
calls 'paternalistic manipulation'. Building itself on 
love, humility, and faith, dialogue becomes a horizontal 
relationship of which mutual trust between the dialoguers is 
the logical consequence. It would be a contradiction in 
terms if dialogue couldn't reconcile love, humility, and 
faith to produce this climate of mutual trust, which leads 
the dialoguers into ever closer partnership in the naming of 
the world. In support of this concept, Claus Mueller (1981) 
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states: "The symbolic and conceptual interpretations 
embedded in ... acquired language become a mediating factor 
that shapes ones's view of the environment." He further 
clarifies the political function of language by pointing out 
that 
it is an important factor which is determined, not only 
by the social context of a society but political 
institutions and interests as well ... both socially 
restricted language and politically manipulated 
language can function as agents promoting the stability 
... of a political order. 
In effect when communication occurs, all natural events are 
subject to reconsideration and revision and, for 
communication to be fruitful, everyone must participate. 
This recalls the earlier passage where Dewey (1916c/1980c) 
declared: 
To be a recipient of a communication is to have an 
enlarged and changed experience. One shares in what 
another has thought and felt ... has his own attitude 
modified. Nor is the one who communicates left 
unaffected. Try the experiment of communicating, with 
fullness and accuracy, some experience to another 
and you will find your own attitude toward your 
experience changing .... The experience has to be 
formulated in order to be communicated. To formulate 
requires getting outside of it, seeing it as another 
would see it, considering what points of contact it has 
with the life of another so that it may be got into 
such form that he can appreciate its meaning (pp. 8-9). 
All these, according to Freire, point to the fact that 
liberation begins with the recognition that, in a free 
society, there is no room for manipulation, cultural 
invasion, conquest, and domination and that there can be 
only participants and subjects in the shaping of a liberated 
society. 
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Giroux states that it would be a contradiction in terms 
to extend without qualification Freire's theory and methods 
to the industrialized and urbanized societies of West. But 
even when acknowledging this one cannot suggest dismissing 
Freire's work outright. Giroux acknowledges that if one 
looks closely at Freire's efforts one will find specific 
themes and practices that will help to enrich and broaden 
radical pedagogy in the West. That Freire's work 
demonstrates the dynamic of progressive change stems, in 
part, from working with people rather than on them. It is 
in the latter spirit of respect for human struggle and hope, 
that an emancipatory pedagogy can be forged, one in which 
radical educators can consolidate and use the insights of 
Freire within the context of their own historical experience 
in order to give new shape to the meaning of radical 
reflection. It is this kind of consolidation and insight 
within my own historical experience that I aspire to in this 
dissertation. 
CHAPTER IV 
TRANSFORMATIVE KNOWLEDGE ROLE IN MULTICULTURAL EDUCATION 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide evidence for 
the claim that multicultural education transforms our 
knowledge. Multicultural education reflects our values, 
ideologies, political positions and human interests. When 
it becomes transformative, the teacher serves as a coach or 
facilitator, trying to evoke certain qualities or 
understandings in the students. By posing certain problems, 
creating certain challenges, and placing the student in 
certain situations, the teacher encourages the student to 
develop his/her own ideas, test them in various ways, and 
further his/her own understanding. I propose that this 
transformative knowledge is essential and must be taught in 
the school and university curriculum. 
For the last decade, there has been a heated national 
debate in the United States surrounding how and what 
knowledge related to ethnic and cultural diversity should be 
taught in the school and university curriculum (Asante 
199la; Glazer, 1991; Schlesinger, 1991). This debate has 
created ethnic and academic tension and friction among 
educators concerning what multicultural education represents 
and about the meaning of multicultural education. There are 
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two distinct groups of scholars engaged in this debate: 
the Western Traditionalists and the Multiculturalists. Each 
of these groups has their different views, assumptions and 
beliefs about the nature of diversity and the role of 
educational institutions in a pluralistic society. Some of 
the Western Traditionalists like Gray (1991), Howe (1991), 
and Woodward (1991) see educational institutions as having a 
mission to defend the dominance of Western Civilization in 
the school and university curriculum, even as awareness of 
non-Western cultures is taught. These scholars contend that 
Western history, literature and culture are endangered in 
the school and university curriculum because of pressure by 
feminist scholars, ethnic minority scholars, and other 
multiculturalists advocating for curriculum reform and 
transformation. On the other hand, the Multiculturalists, 
Butler and Walter (1991), Gates (1992), Grant (1991), and 
Takaki (1993) contend that the school, college, and 
university curriculum has failed to assimilate the 
experiences of people, race and culture. They believe that 
the curriculum should be reformed to reflect the history and 
culture of ethnic groups and women. From their perspective 
Western Traditionalism is viewed as exclusionary and limited 
rather than inclusive and generative. 
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The Nature of Knowledge 
According to Bower and Hilgard (1981), philosophers for 
many centuries have been battling with the nature of man. 
When psychology split off from philosophy to become the 
"science of mental life", the questions asked were: What is 
the relation of the mind to the body? How does the mind 
develop from birth? How does it acquire knowledge of the 
world? How does it come to know other minds; to know 
itself? What drives humans to action? What is the self? 
What produces continuity of personal identity? (p. 1). 
The study of learning and memory came from two 
philosophical sources: the analysis of knowledge (how we 
come to know things), and the analysis of the nature and 
organization of mental life. The first issue concerns what 
philosophers call epistemology, the theory of knowledge. 
The second issue concerns the nature and contents of our 
concepts, thought, images, discernments, reminiscences, and 
imaginations; the further question here involves what 
operations, rules, or laws underlie these mental phenomena. 
As Bower and Hilgard (1981) pointed out, the study of 
learning may be called experimental epistemology, since 
learning and knowing seem related in the same way as a 
process is to its result, as acquiring is to a possession, 
as painting is to a picture. According to Bower and Hilgard 
(1981), the American Heritage Dictionary (1983) defines 
knowledge as "familiarity, awareness, or understandings 
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gained through experience or study. The sum or range of 
what has been perceived, discovered or inferred" (p. 384). 
One conceptualization of knowledge is derived from Farganis 
(1986), and recognizes that it is broad and is used in the 
psychological and sociological context of knowledge 
literature to include ideas, values, and interpretation. 
Another school of thought, constructivism, refers to 
knowledge as the internal mental constructions of the 
individual. Von Glaserfeld (1989) emphasizes that one can 
never know what is in the mind of another and, therefore, 
can never place knowledge in books or other human artifacts: 
"Once we come to see this essential and inescapable 
subjectivity of linguistic meaning, we can no longer 
maintain the preconceived notion that words convey ideas or 
knowledge" (p. 133). Because socioculturalists are more 
interested in interactions among individuals and the social 
construction and transmission of language, they are more 
likely to use knowledge in relation to these cultural 
artifacts. For examples, Driver et al. (1994) state: "We 
argue that it is important in science education to 
appreciate that scientific knowledge is both symbolic in 
nature and also socially negotiated" (p. 5). 
Postmodern theorists, Code (1991), Harding (1991), and 
Rorty (1989) have pointed out that knowledge is socially 
constructed and reflects human interests, values, and. 
action. However, since many complex factors influence the 
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knowledge that is created by an individual group, including 
the actuality of what occurred, the knowledge that people 
create is heavily influenced by their interpretations of 
their experiences and their positions within particular 
social, economic, and political systems and structure of a 
society. 
Giroux (1981) concludes that the knowledge, beliefs, 
expectations, and biases that define a given rationality 
both condition, and are conditioned by the experiences into 
which we enter. Of crucial importance is the notion that 
such experiences only become meaningful within a mode of 
rationality that confers intelligibility on them (p. 8). 
In the Western empirical tradition, the ideal within 
each academic discipline is the formulation of knowledge 
without the influence of the researcher's personal or 
cultural characteristics (Greer, 1969; Kaplan, 1964). On 
the other hand, the postmodern theorists (Cherryholmes, 
1988; Foucault, 1972; Habermas, 1971; Rorty, 1989; Young 
1971) state that personal, cultural, and social factors 
influence the formulation of knowledge even when objective 
knowledge is the ideal within a discipline. Sometimes the 
researchers themselves are unaware of how their personal 
experiences and positions within society influence the 
knowledge they produce. 
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Knowledge Construction 
I am of the opinion that the positions of both Western 
Traditionalists and the Multiculturalists reflect values, 
ideologies, political positions, and human interests. Each 
position also implies a kind of knowledge that should be 
taught in the school and university curriculum. I will 
present different kinds of knowledge that exist in society 
and in educational institutions. This information is 
designed to assist practicing educators and researchers in 
identifying types of knowledge that reflect particular 
values, assumptions, perspectives, and ideological 
positions. 
Banks (1991) points out that teachers should assist 
students to understand all types of knowledge. Students 
should be involved in debates about knowledge construction 
and conflicting interpretations, for example the extent to 
which Africa and Phoenicia influenced Greek civilization. 
Students should be taught how to create their own 
interpretations of the past and present, as well as how to 
identify their own positions, interests, ideologies, and 
assumptions. Research should be presented in such a way to 
assist students to become critical thinkers who have the 
knowledge, attitudes, skills, and commitments needed to 
think for themselves. Multicultural education is an 
education for functioning effectively in a pluralistic 
democratic society. Helping students to develop the 
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knowledge, skills, and attitudes needed to participate in 
reflective civic action is one of the major goals. Freire 
(1970) seems to share a similar view with Banks when he 
states that: 
the more radical the person is, the more fully he or 
she enters into reality so that, knowing it better, he 
or she can better transform it. This individual is not 
afraid to confront, to listen, to the world unveiled. 
This person is not afraid to meet the people or to 
enter into dialogue with them. This person does not 
consider himself or herself the proprietor of history 
or of all people, or the liberator of the oppressed; 
but he or she does commit himself or herself, within 
history, to fight at their side (p. 21). 
I will propose that students should study all five 
types of knowledge that will be discussed later in this 
chapter. However, my focus and philosophical position are 
within the transformative knowledge tradition in ethnic 
studies and multicultural education. This tradition links 
knowledge, social commitment, and action. A transformative, 
action-oriented curriculum, in my view, can best be 
implemented when students examine different types of 
knowledge in a democratic classroom where they can freely 
examine their own and others' perspectives and moral 
commitments. This is because knowledge emerges only through 
invention and re-invention, through the restless, impatient; 
continuing, hopeful inquiry human beings pursue in the 
world, with the world, and with each other. 
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Philosophical Position 
Positionality is a new concept that emerged out of 
feminist scholarship. It reveals the importance of 
identifying the frames of reference from which scholars and 
writers present their data, interpretations, analyses, and 
instruction. Code (1991) and Harding (1991) pointed out the 
need for researchers and scholars to identify their 
ideological positions and normative assumptions in their 
works. This is consonant with feminist and ethnic studies 
scholarship which is in contrast with the empirical paradigm 
that has dominated science and research in the West. The 
assumption within the Western empirical paradigm is that the 
knowledge produced within it is neutral and objective and 
that its principles are universal and dis-embedded from the 
thinking or experience of any one individual or group. 
Postmodern and critical theorists such as Paulo Freire 
(1970), Habermas (1971), and Giroux (1983), and feminist 
postmodern theorists such as Farganis (1986) , Code (1991), 
and Harding (1991} have developed important critiques of 
positivist, empirical knowledge. They argue that despite 
its claims, modern science is not value free but contains 
important human interests and normative assumptions that 
should be identified, discussed, and examined. 
Code (1991), a feminist epistemologist, states that 
academic knowledge is both subjective and objective and that 
both aspects should be recognized and discussed. Freire 
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(1970) appears to share similar views about knowledge with 
Code by saying that for the individual the subjective aspect 
exists only in relation to the objective aspect (the 
concrete reality, which is the object of analysis). 
Subjectivity and objectivity thus join in a dialectical 
unity producing knowledge in solidarity with action, and 
vice versa (p. 20). Code (1991) states that we need to ask 
these questions: "Out of whose subjectivity has this ideal 
of objectivity grown? Whose standpoint, whose values does 
it represent?" She writes: 
The point of the questions is to discover how 
subjective and objective conditions together produce 
knowledge, values, and epistemology. It is neither to 
reject objectivity nor to glorify subjectivity in its 
stead. Knowledge is neither value-free nor 
value-neutral; the processes that produce it are 
themselves value-laden; and these values are open to 
evaluation (p. 70). 
Code (1991), Gordon (1985), and Harding (1991) 
pointed out that empirical scholarship has been limited by 
the assumptions and biases that are implicit within it, 
although these biases and assumptions have been infrequently 
recognized by the scholars and researchers themselves and by 
the consumers of their works, such as other scholars, 
professors, teachers, and the general reader. Ladner (1973) 
and Phillips (1918) maintained that the lack of recognition 
and identification of these biases, assumptions, 
perspectives, and points of view have frequently victimized 
women and people of color such as Africans, African-
Americans and American Indians because of the stereotypes 
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and misconceptions that have been perpetuated about them in 
the historical and social science literature. Code (1991) 
raised the question, "Is the sex of the knower 
epistemologically significant?" She answered in the 
affirmative because of the ways in which gender influences 
how knowledge is constructed, interpreted, and 
institutionalized in the West. The ethnic and cultural 
experiences of the knower are also epistemologically 
significant because these factors influence knowledge 
construction, use, and interpretation in the western 
society. 
Gordon, Miller, and Rollock (1990) point out that 
mainstream social scientists have often viewed diversity as 
deviance and differences as deficits. Acun (1988), Harding 
(1981), King and Mitchell (1990), and Merton (1972), on the 
other hand, pointed out that an important outcome of the 
revisionist and transformative interpretations that have 
been produced by scholars working in feminist and ethnic 
studies is that many misconceptions and partial truths about 
women and ethnic groups have been viewed from different and 
more complete perspectives. Merton (1972) in one of her 
essays pointed out that the perspectives of both "insiders" 
and "outsiders" are needed to enable social scientists to 
gain a complete view of social reality. Anna Julia Cooper 
(1892/1969), the African American educator, like Mert9n, has 
a similar view when she said that women's perspectives 
enlarged our vision: 
103 
"The world has had to limp along with 
the wobbling gait and the one-sided hesitancy of a man with 
one eye. Suddenly the bandage is removed from the other eye 
and the whole body is filled with light. It sees a circle 
where before it saw a segment" (p. viii). 
Types of Knowledge 
Teachers and curriculum specialists, by addressing 
various types of knowledge, can bring into view the content 
needed to make the curriculum multicultural. Each of the 
types of knowledge selected for description will reflect 
particular purposes, perspectives, experiences, goals and 
human interests. The idea of exposing students to various 
types of knowledge can assist them to better understand the 
perspectives of different racial, ethnic, and cultural 
groups as well as to develop their own versions and 
interpretations of issues and events. 
These are the different types of knowledge Banks (1993) 
and Prawat (1993) have identified: (1) Idea-Based Social 
Constructivism; (2) Personal/Cultural Knowledge; (3) 
Mainstream Academic Knowledge; (4) Transformative Academic 
Knowledge; and (5) School Knowledge. The categories are 
useful conceptual tools for reflection about knowledge and 
for planning multicultural teaching. 
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Idea-Based Social Constructivism 
Idea-based social constructivism is an attempt to build 
on Gibson's (1966, 1979) suggestion that, in light of his 
ecological approach to visual perception, we reconsider what 
is meant by higher mental processes like thinking, 
conceiving, knowing, and expecting. Gibson concluded that 
"to perceive the environment and to conceive it are 
different in degree but not in kind." He went on to say: 
Our reasons for supposing that seeing something is 
quite unlike knowing something come from the old 
doctrine that seeing is having temporary sensations one 
after another at the passing moment of present time, 
whereas knowing is having permanent concepts stored in 
memory. It should now be clear that perceptual seeing 
is an awareness of persisting structure (p. 258). 
Neisser (1976), responding to Gibson's suggestion, 
pointed out that in adopting an ecological perspective, 
cognitive psychologists might downplay the perceiver's 
contribution to the perceptual act. By highlighting the 
role of perceptual schemata in this process, Neisser 
attempted to strike a balance between person and 
environment. Perceptual schemata, in Neisser's theory, 
constitute a set of "anticipations" that alert the 
individual to certain aspects of the environment, guiding 
and constraining perception while also remaining receptive 
to new input as the search process unfolds. Ideas or 
concepts function like perceptual schemata. They are "wake 
up calls" to new ideas and concepts. They assist to educate 
attention, opening us up to aspects of the world that are a 
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potential source of wonder. Even relatively mundane ideas 
can open up new windows to the world. They are sources of 
transformation to new insights. Von Foerster (1984) 
illustrates this with an example taken from one of Moliere's 
plays. Jourdain is depicted as a common man suddenly grown 
rich and eager to acquire the culture and sophistication of 
his aristocratic friends: On one occasion his new friends 
speak about poetry and prose, and Jourdain discovers to his 
amazement and great delight that whenever he speaks, he 
He is overwhelmed by this discovery: "I am speaks prose. 
speaking Prose! I have always spoken Prose! I have spoken 
Prose throughout my whole life!" (p. 41). This one idea, 
the link between the spoken and the written word, excites 
Jourdain beyond measure. New ideas have potential power. 
To quote Bruner (1969) new ideas are often "lithe and 
beautiful and immensely generative" (p. 121). 
Kant brought imagination into the equation arguing that 
it is imagination that allows us to apply our thoughts or 
ideas to things. Building on the work of philosophers such 
as Kant, Warnock (1976) emphasizes the importance of what 
she terms "thought-imbued perception". Thought imbued 
perception "enables us to see the world, whether present or 
absent as significant, and also to present this vision to 
others, for them to share or reject" (p. 196). As Floden 
(1987) noted, Dewey brought experience into the equation: 
"Dewey saw education as a journey into the unknown. 
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Experiences are not 'educative' if they only give students 
greater skill and ease in dealing with things with which 
they are already familiar" (p. 500). Dewey held that 
education should open youngsters to the unique kind of 
experience that results from the mastery of subject matter 
knowledge--knowledge that would be inaccessible to the young 
if they were left "to pick up their training in informal 
association with others" (p. 500). 
Several arguments I have cited here tend to favor 
idea-based constructivism as one of the different types of 
knowledge that transforms us as an individual. Neisser 
(1976), building on Gibson's groundbreaking work on 
perception, was one of the first psychologists to build a 
case for this approach to learning and cognition. He 
introduced a construct "perceptual schemata" to deal with 
the most difficult problem facing learning theorists, on how 
to account for the fact that less complex intellectual 
structures give rise to more complex structures. Constructs 
like mental images, maps, and ideas are derived from the 
perceptual process. According to Neisser (1976), they 
represent "anticipatory phases of that activity"; they are 
schemata that the perceiver has "detached" from the 
perceptual cycle. Thus, in conjuring up an image, a map, or 
an idea, one need only prepare a plan for picking up the 
information that might be provided by the environment. As a 
result of this deliberate effort, the individual creates a 
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simultaneous and somewhat contradictory anticipation that of 
perceiving and not really perceiving the object or event in 
question. 
Following Neisser's argument, ideas represent 
anticipations. They direct attention to important aspects 
of the environment that otherwise would go unnoticed. Ideas 
educate our attention, enabling us to search out important 
details, as part of the perceptual process. These details, 
in turn, enrich our understanding of powerful ideas. 
According to Brown, Collins, and Duguid (1989) an idea 
continually evolves as it is used "because new situations, 
negotiations, and activities inevitably recast it in a new, 
more densely textured form" (p. 33). Furthermore ideas, 
when they are used to describe and explain objects or 
events, acquire meaning that they cannot posses when they 
are known only in an abstract or definitional way. Wilensky 
(1992) agrees with the notion that ideas evolve: "It is 
only through use and acquaintance in multiple contexts, 
through coming into relationship with other words, concepts, 
experiences that the word [idea] has meaning for the learner 
and in our sense becomes concrete for him or her" (p. 9). 
This notion that an idea's meaning is worked out in the 
context of its use is consistent with Vygotsky's notions 
about how scientific and spontaneous (i.e., experiential) 
concepts interact. This is also consistent with Gee~s 
(1992) recent formulation: 
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What is in the head according to a connectionist view 
of the mind/brain is the wrong sort of thing to be a 
memory, a meaning, a belief, or other 'psychological 
entity' . It is only the right sort of thing to be a 
prerequisite for getting into and playing out social 
practices in much the same way that a body skilled in a 
certain way is the prerequisite for getting into and 
staying in a game of baseball. The social practices I 
refer to each constitute socioculturally different 
notions of what 'count' as memories, meanings, values, 
and beliefs and the links among these (p. xviii). 
Gee's quotation is adrem (to the point) at this point 
because it highlights the social nature of the process of 
idea formation and transformation. It is through dialogue 
that our social differences and lack of understanding get 
resolved. Gee's sociolinguistic approach appears to be 
highly compatible with that of Cobb's negotiating process. 
Both tend to emphasize the transformational aspects of idea 
development, that is, the changes in thinking that result 
from discussing ideas in a social context. 
Personal and Cultural Knowledge 
Personal and cultural knowledge constitutes concepts, 
explanations, and interpretations that students derive from 
personal experiences in their homes, families, and community 
cultures. The assumptions, perspectives, and insights that 
students derive from their experiences in their homes and 
community cultures are used as mirrors to view and interpret 
the knowledge and experiences that they encounter in the 
school and in other institutions within the larger society. 
Vygotsky (1981) supports this view when concluding that 
humans create themselves through activity. The tools used 
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for this mastery are psychological tools. Peers and adults 
assist in this self-shaping process by helping children 
learn how to use their culture's psychological and technical 
tools. Psychological tools are the language, systems, 
counting systems, writing, diagrams, maps, conventional 
signs, and works of art. A culture's tools connect 
children, through their activities, with the physical and 
social world. A culture creates these tools to help people 
master the environment. The favored tools are passed on to 
children during social interchanges, and in turn the tools 
shape children's minds. Children use these tools to think. 
Cultural tools actually transform thought. For example, 
once language is used to help memory, the nature of 
remembering may change to a more verbal form. 
Fordham and Ogbu (1986) point out that low-income 
African-American students of ten experience academic 
difficulties in the school because of the ways that cultural 
knowledge within their community conflicts with school 
knowledge, norms, and expectations. They posit that these 
students believe that if they master the knowledge taught in 
the schools they will be violating their own norms and run 
the risk of "acting white". Delpit (1988) noted that 
African-American students are often ignorant of school 
cultural knowledge regarding power relationships. As a 
result they experience academic and behavioral problems 
because of their failure to conform to established norms, 
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rules, and expectations. She recommends that teachers 
assist African-American students to learn the rules of power 
in the school cultures by explicitly teaching them to the 
students. The cultural knowledge that many African 
American, Latino, and American Indian students bring to 
school conflict with school norms and values, with school 
knowledge, and with the ways that teachers interpret and 
mediate school knowledge. 
According to Milner (1983) personal and cultural 
knowledge becomes problematic when it conflicts with 
scientific ways of validating knowledge, is oppositional to 
the culture of the school, or challenges the main tenets and 
assumptions of mainstream academic knowledge. Much of the 
knowledge about out-groups that students learn from their 
home and community cultures consists of misconceptions, 
stereotypes, and partial truth. Many students in the United 
States are socialized within communities that are segregated 
along racial, ethnic and social class lines. Consequently 
the youths have few opportunities to learn firsthand about 
the cultures of people from different racial, ethnic, 
cultural, religious and social-class groups. This presents 
a challenge to teachers as they attempt to bridge the gap 
between cultural boundaries. An important goal of education 
must be to free students from their cultural and ethnic 
boundaries and enable them to cross cultural borders,freely. 
Grant and Sleeter (1991) noted that the school has 
consistently paid lip service to students' personal and 
cultural knowledge and has concentrated on teaching them 
school knowledge. The result has been positive for most 
white students and negative for minority students. 
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It is important for educators to be aware of the 
personal and cultural knowledge of students when designing 
the curriculum for today's multicultural schools. I will 
return to this issue in a discussion of the methodology of 
multicultural education in the next chapter after reviewing 
additional types of knowledge that can be helpful for 
teachers in school curriculum. 
Mainstream Academic Knowledge 
Mainstream academic knowledge consists of the concepts, 
paradigms, theories, and explanations that constitute 
traditional and established knowledge in the behavioral and 
social sciences. Greer (1969), Kaplan (1964), and Sleeter 
(1991) stated that an important tenet within the mainstream 
academic paradigm is that there is a set of objective truths 
that can be verified through rigorous and objective research 
procedures that are uninfluenced by human interests, values, 
and perspectives. Much of this objective knowledge 
originated in the West but is considered universal in nature 
and application. This empirical knowledge, supposedly 
uninfluenced by human values and interests, constitutes the 
core of the school and university curriculum. Mainstream 
academic knowledge consists of the theories and 
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interpretations that are internalized and accepted by most 
university researchers, academic societies, and 
organizations such as the American Historical Association, 
the American Sociological Association, the American 
Psychological Association, and the National Academy of 
Sciences. 
Recently, university scholars have begun to question 
the empirical paradigm that dominates Western Science, among 
them Paulo Freire (1970), Giroux (1983), Cherryholmes 
(1988), Rosenau (1992), Takaki (1979), Punn Allen (1986), 
and Banks (1988) . Most of the serious challenges come from 
academics outside the mainstream, such as scholars within 
the transformative academic community. These challenges 
result in changes, reinterpretations, debates, disagreements 
and ultimately to paradigm shifts, new theories and 
interpretations which is healthy for scholarly advancement. 
Many examples can be given of both the alteration and 
stagnation of mainstream academic knowledge. Examining late 
19th and early 20th century mainstream academic knowledge, a 
tremendous change has occurred in historic accounts of 
slavery and treatment of the American Indian. For example, 
Stampp (1956) pointed out the book written by Ulrich B. 
Philips on American Negro Slavery, published in 1918, 
dominated the way Black Slavery was interpreted until his 
views were challenged by research in the 1950's. Philips 
was a respected authority on the South and Slavery. His 
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book, which became a historical classic, is essentially an 
apology for Southern Slaveholders. With books published by 
Blassingame (1972), Genovese (1972), and Gutman (1976), a 
new paradigm about slavery was developed in the 1970's that 
drew heavily upon the slaves' view of their own experiences. 
During the same period, Hoxie (1988) pointed out that the 
American Indian was portrayed in mainstream academic 
knowledge as either a noble or hostile savage, and of 
course, children were taught the notion that Columbus 
discovered America. Over time, these ideas became 
institutionalized within mainstream academic knowledge. 
Transformative Academic Knowledge 
Transformative academic knowledge consists of concepts, 
paradigms, themes, and explanations that challenge 
mainstream academic knowledge. Transformative academic 
knowledge challenges some of the key assumptions that 
mainstream scholars make about the nature of knowledge. 
Transformative and mainstream academic knowledge are based 
on different epistemological assumptions (concepts) about 
the nature of knowledge, about the nature of human interests 
and values on knowledge construction, and about the purpose 
of knowledge. 
Mainstream academic knowledge postulates that knowledge 
is neutral, objective, and uninfluenced by human interests 
and values. Transformative academic knowledge reflects 
postmodern assumptions about the nature and goals of 
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knowledge (Foucault, 1972; Rorty, 1989; Rosenau, 1992). 
Transformative academic scholars such as Code (1991), 
Harding (1991), King and Mitchell (1990), and Minnich (1990) 
believe that knowledge is not neutral but is influenced by 
human interests, that all knowledge reflects the power and 
social relationships within society, and that an important 
purpose of knowledge construction is to help people improve 
society. 
Transformative knowledge has led to re-interpretation 
of some mainstream academic knowledge. Columbus did not 
discover America. This Indian land had been in existence 
over 50,000 years before the Europeans came. Mongo Park did 
not discover the River Niger. River Niger had been in 
existence in Nigeria before Mongo Park sailed to River Niger 
in the 18th century. 
George Washington Williams (1982/1986) published, in 
two volumes, the first comprehensive history of African 
Americans in the United States, A History of the Negro Race 
in America from 1618 to 1880. Williams, like other African-
American scholars after him decided to research and write 
about the Black experience because of the neglect of African 
Americans by mainstream historians and social scientists and 
because of the stereotypes and misconceptions about African 
Americans that appeared in mainstream scholarship. 
Another outstanding and prolific African-American 
scholar in U.S. history whose work is emerging only now as 
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academic knowledge goes through transformation, is W.E.B. 
DuBois (1868-1963) . DuBois devoted his long and prolific 
career to the formulation of new data, concepts, and 
paradigms that could be used to reinterpret the Black 
experience and reveal the role that African Americans played 
in the development of American society. Carter G. Woodson 
(1875-1950), the historian and educator who founded the 
Association for the Study of Negro Life and History and the 
Journal of Negro History, also challenged established 
paradigms about the treatment of African-Americans in a 
series of important publications. 
Transformative Scholarship Since the 1970's 
Many academicians have produced outstanding research 
and theories since the early 1970's that have challenged and 
modified institutionalized stereotypes and misconceptions 
about ethnic minorities. These scholars have formulated new 
ideas and paradigms, and forced mainstream scholars to 
rethink established interpretations. Much of the 
transformative academic knowledge that has been produced in 
multicultural education since the 1970's is becoming 
institutionalized within mainstream academic scholarship and 
within the school, college, and university curriculum. 
Ronald T. Takaki (1993), one of the outstanding 
scholars in transformative knowledge, has written 
extensively on the potential of multiculturalism. In his 
work he poses a question: "Is multiculturalism a 
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battleground or a meeting ground"? In response to this 
question Takaki identifies two emerging perspectives. The 
"cultural war" he says has resulted to series of debate on 
what should be the content of the curriculum in schools, 
colleges and universities. 
This indeed has become a battleground of ideas for 
mainstream academic scholars and multicultural academic 
scholars. Takaki questions whether we are limited to a 
choice between a "disuniting" multiculturalism and a common 
American culture, or whether we can transform the "culture 
war" into a meeting ground? In response to this question 
Gerald Graff (1992) suggested that the intellectual 
combatants of this conflict have the potential to enrich 
American education. As universities become "contested 
terrains of different point of views, gray and monotonous 
cloisters of Eurocentric knowledge can become brave new 
worlds, dynamic and multicultural" (p. 15). On these 
academic meeting grounds, scholars and students can engage 
each other in dialogue and debate, informed by the heat and 
light generated by the examination of opposing texts such as 
Joseph Conrad's Heart of Darkness and Chinua Achebe's Things 
Fall Apart. Graff (1992) points out that 
teaching the conflicts has nothing to do with 
relativism or denying the existence of truth. The best 
way to make relativists of students is to expose them 
to an endless series of different positions which are 
not debated before their eyes (p. 15). 
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Takaki (1992) maintains that the need to open American 
minds to greater cultural diversity will not go away. 
Takaki believes that teachers can resist this imperative by 
ignoring the changing racial composition of student bodies 
and the larger society, or they can embrace this timely and 
exciting intellectual opportunity to revitalize the social 
sciences and humanities. Takaki refers to an interesting 
point made by Henry Louis Gates (1992) which states that 
the study of the humanities is the study of the 
possibilities of human life in culture. It thrives on 
diversity .... The new (ethnic studies) scholarship has 
invigorated the traditional disciplines. What 
distinguishes the university from other battlegrounds, 
such as the media and politics, is that the university 
has a special commitment to the search for knowledge, 
one based on a process of intellectual openness and 
inquiry. Multiculturalism can stoke this critical 
spirit by transforming the university into a crucial 
meeting ground for different viewpoints. In the 
process, perhaps we will be able to discover what makes 
us an American people (p. 114). 
This meeting ground is what Paulo Freire (1970) calls 
dialogue. Freire believes as I do that this meeting ground 
cannot exist without people engaging in critical thinking, 
thinking which perceives reality as process, as 
transformation, rather than as a static entity. This 
transformative process engages us into action without fear 
of the risks involved. The best arena for this 
transformation of reality is the schools, colleges and 
universities. I believe that higher education institutions 
should be where scholars of different viewpoints engage each 
other over the meaning and content of culture. It is in 
these institutions that transformative scholarship has 
challenged and modified institutionalized stereotypes and 
misconceptions about ethnic minorities. 
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A group of African and African-American scholars have 
challenged established interpretation about the origin of 
Greek civilization and the extent to which Greek 
civilization was influenced by African cultures. These 
scholars include Diop (1974), Williams (1987), and Van 
Sertima (1988-1989) . Cheikh Anta Diop is one of the most 
influential African scholars who has challenged established 
interpretations about the origin of Greek civilization. In 
Black Nations and Culture, published in 1955, he sets forth 
an important thesis that states that Africa is an important 
root of Western civilization. Diop argues that Egypt "was 
the node and center of a vast web linking the strands of 
cultures and languages; that the light that crystallized at 
the center of this early world had been energized by the 
cultural electricity streaming from the heartland of Africa" 
(p. 8) • 
Bernal (1987-1991) supported the views of Diop, 
Williams and Van Sertima that Greek civilization originated 
in ancient Egypt and Phoenicia. Bernal believes that the 
contributions of Egypt and Phoenicia to Greek civilization 
have been deliberately ignored by classical scholars because 
of their biased attitudes toward non white peoples and 
Semites. Bernal has published two of four planned volumes 
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of his study Black Athena. In his second volume in 
reference to Begley, Chideya and Wilson (1991) he uses 
evidence from linguistics, archeology and ancient documents 
to substantiate his claim that "between 2100 and 1100 B.C; 
when Greek culture was born, the people of the Aegean 
borrowed, adapted or had thrust upon them deities and 
language, technologies and architectures, notions of justice 
and polis" from Egypt and Phoenicia (p. 50) . Because of the 
transformative scholarship of Diop, Williams, Van Sertima 
and Bernal these challenges have had some impact on school 
knowledge. 
School Knowledge 
School knowledge consists of textbooks, teachers' 
guides and interpretations of that knowledge designed for 
school use. The textbook is the main source of school 
knowledge. According to Anyon (1979), Sleeter and Grant 
(1991) textbook studies, these are the major themes in 
school knowledge in the United States: (1) America's 
founding fathers, such as Washington and Jefferson, were 
highly moral, liberty-loving men who championed equality and 
justice for all Americans; (2) the United States is a nation 
with justice, liberty, and freedom for all; (3) Social class 
divisions are not significant issues in the United States; 
(4) There are no significant gender, class or racial 
divisions within United States society; (5) Ethnic groups of 
color and whites interact largely in harmony in the United 
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States. 
Research by Anyan (1979, 1981) and Sleeter and Grant 
(1991b) on textbooks indicate that textbooks present a 
highly selective view of social reality. That knowledge is 
static rather than dynamic, and encourages students to 
master isolated facts rather than to develop complex 
understandings of social reality. These studies also 
indicate that textbooks reinforce the dominant social, 
economic and power arrangements within society. Students 
are encouraged to accept rather than to question these 
arrangements. Historically, schooling has served the 
purpose of cultural transmission, and the culture 
transmitted has been primarily that of dominant groups. It 
is widely recognized that members of culturally influential 
and dominant groups have established and shaped the public 
school system and its curricula as we have come to know 
them. Three decades ago, in Culture Against Man, 
anthropologist Jules Henry (1963) observed that schools are 
intended to teach young people to be unquestioning, not out 
of conspiratorial intent to squelch intelligent inquiry but 
simply to conserve the culture. No culture can withstand 
widespread interrogation or creativity. He noted: 
It stands to reason that were young people truly 
creative the culture would fall apart, for originality, 
by definition, is different from what is given, and 
what is given is the culture itself .... American 
classrooms, like educational institutions anywhere, 
express the values, preoccupations, and fears found in 
the culture as a whole. School has no choice; it must 
train the children to fit the culture as it is (pp. 
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286-287). 
While public schooling serves to sustain more than subvert 
the status quo, it is not static. Reflecting the host 
society, it also reflects changes in that society such as 
recent attention to gender equality and computer literacy. 
Furthermore school knowledge conveys both the dominant or 
mainstream culture and the intellectual means to challenge 
it if one chooses to do so. For example, despite 
unjustifiable inequalities, most students have at least some 
opportunity to obtain knowledge of the U.S. political system 
and the history of conflict and change in the U.S. polity, 
economy, and society. The reading and information gathering 
capacity incites one to learn more about the issues. 
Apple (1993) referring to the Reagan/Bush 
administration years, pointed out that there was a contest 
to control school knowledge. Large-scale school-business 
partnerships were popular such as privatization and the wide 
spread introduction of computer instruction. The "Official 
Knowledge" Apple commented was a selective self-revelation 
more akin to personal memoir than cultural analysis and 
critique. "Official Knowledge's" purpose is to analyze "the 
struggles over curriculum, teaching, and policy at a variety 
of levels". Apple (1993) points to possibilities as well as 
limitations of the circumstances of the early 1990's. Apple 
(1993) outlines an ambitious and critically important 
agenda, particularly given continuing movement toward 
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nationwide if not national standards and assessment. He 
wrote: 
The politics of official knowledge are the politics of 
accords or compromises. They are usually not 
impositions, but signify how dominant groups try to 
create situations where the compromises that are formed 
favor them. These compromises occur at different 
levels: at the level of political and ideological 
discourse, at the level of state policies, at the level 
of the daily activities of teachers and students in 
classrooms, and at the level of how we are to 
understand all of this (p. 10). 
Apple states that the Official Knowledge is most 
successful at addressing the political and ideological 
discourse. Here Apple reiterates his analyses of 
knowledge-power relationships, the role of textbooks, and 
the debates over textbooks as cultural politics. 
Altbach and Kelly (1991), and Fitzgerald (1979) 
pointed out that a number of powerful factors influence the 
development and production of school textbooks. One of the 
most important is the publisher's perception of statements 
and images that might be controversial. When textbooks 
become controversial, school districts often refuse to adopt 
and to purchase them. When developing a textbook, the 
publisher and the authors must also consider the development 
and reading levels of the students, state and district 
guidelines about what subject matter textbooks should 
include, and recent trends and developments in a content 
field that teachers and administrators will expect the 
textbook to reflect and incorporate. Anyon (1979) and 
Sleeter and Grant (1991) pointed out that because of the 
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number of constraints and influences on the development of 
textbooks, school knowledge often does not include in-depth 
discussions and analyses of some of the major problems in 
American society, such as racism, sexism, social class 
stratification, and poverty. As a result, school knowledge 
is influenced mostly by mainstream academic knowledge and 
popular knowledge. Transformative academic knowledge 
usually has little direct influence on school knowledge and 
then only after it has become a part of mainstream and 
popular knowledge. It is proposed that teachers must make 
special efforts to introduce transformative knowledge and 
perspective to elementary and secondary school, even though 
we know as Margaret Bachmann and Robert E. Floden (1993) 
would say "we aim to recover the meaning of school as a 
place set apart, where truth and the social order do not 
coincide" (p. 35). Multicultural education is one way this 
transformative knowledge can be introduced. 
CHAPTER V 
GENERAL PRINCIPLES APPLYING TO CLASSROOM METHODOLOGY 
Recognizing the importance of multicultural education 
in our institutions of learning, it is very important for us 
to look at the methodological concepts that can serve to 
transform our institutions and society at large. 
I am advocating reciprocal methodology in our 
educational system as one of the best ways transformative 
knowledge can emerge from multicultural education. The 
reason for advocating this method is its use by many 
educators in the field of psychology and social sciences as 
one of the best techniques for facilitating the acquisition 
of knowledge in a democratic society. 
The point in question here concerns the issue of how 
knowledge, of whatever form, is be transmitted to the young 
person. What kind of educational methodology do we have? 
What kind do we need? How do we get from one to the other? 
In addressing these issues, Glaser (1990) evaluated 
several programs designed to teach cognitive skills. He 
noted there is a strong trend within the research literature 
supporting a reemergence of learning theory within 
instructional design. The instructional design techniques 
promise to facilitate the acquisition of new knowledge 
124 
125 
through Reciprocal Teaching. Brown and Campione (1986) 
point out that the technique has received very favorable 
reviews in the literature. The reciprocal teaching 
procedure consists of three components. The first component 
consists of the instruction and practice of self-regulatory 
and/or executive strategies. Participants are taught to 
predict, analyze, summarize etc. The second component 
consists of a series of small groups in which learners take 
turns being the leader and directing the group through the 
learning process. The moderator or facilitator of the model 
is seen as an expert. The reciprocal teaching method 
focuses on the importance of the social aspect of teaching 
and learning. The assumption is that learning takes place 
in a cooperative environment and is a social, group 
experience. The reciprocal teaching approach reflects a 
Vygotskian perspective. Vygotsky (1986) claimed that 
instruction functions within a Zone of Proximal Development 
(ZPD) . During the third component of the reciprocal 
teaching procedure, the learner's level of functioning is 
systematically assessed. Then, with the assistance of an 
expert, the learner's development through the zone can be 
supported. It is assumed that a learner is engaged in a 
constant process of setting up new ZPDs. The ZPD is 
flexible not fixed, and through reciprocal teaching process 
the learner realizes his/her potential. Vygotsky emppasized 
that learning first takes place on the external plane, and 
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that the learner moves from learning on an external to 
internal plane. Internalization is considered to be the key 
mechanism of change. 
Gardner (1991) supports this process in what he termed 
the "transformative" approach. In this approach: 
rather than modeling the desired behavior, the teacher 
serves as a coach or facilitator, trying to evoke 
certain qualities or understanding in the students. By 
posing certain problems, creating certain challenges, 
placing the student in certain situations, the teacher 
hopes to encourage the student to work out his own 
understanding (p. 119). 
Piaget (1979) urged a reciprocal relationship between 
teachers and students where respect for the teacher 
coexisted with cooperative and teacher-centered pedagogy. 
Piaget wrote, "If the aim of intellectual training is to 
form the intelligence rather than to stock the memory, and 
to produce intellectual explorers rather than mere 
erudition, then traditional education is manifestly guilty 
of a grave deficiency" (p. 51). Curriculum, he concluded, 
is the deficiency in schools which gives the students no 
leeway to conceptualize their own ideas, only those of the 
teacher. A curriculum that is resistant to questioning 
school and society is not neutral. It cuts off students' 
development as critical thinkers and they lose the ability 
to evaluate the issues before them. If the students' task 
is to memorize rules and existing knowledge, without 
questioning the subject matter or the learning proces_s, 
their potential for critical thought and action will be 
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restricted. 
Shor (1991), in support of reciprocal methods, points 
out that any curriculum that does not challenge the standard 
conditions in society reflects to students that knowledge 
and the world are fixed, with no role for students to play 
in transforming them, and no need for change. Freire (1985) 
pointed out that any education that tries to be neutral 
supports the dominant ideology in society. 
The teacher facilitates the relationship between 
outside authorities, formal knowledge, and individual 
students in the classroom. The teacher links the student's 
development to the values, powers, and debates in society. 
The curriculum the teacher teaches gives students a 
prolonged encounter with structured knowledge and social 
authority. During this encounter, the student begins the 
inquiry about the meaning of the past events, the 
possibilities for the future, and his or her place in the 
world they live in. Teachers have several methods to 
influence this knowledge as they relate to student 
experiences and attempt to meet the challenges of educating: 
(1) as a celebration of the existing society, (2) as a 
falsely neutral avoidance of problems rooted in the system, 
or (3) as a critical inquiry into power and knowledge. 
In schools, as Giroux (1983) and Banks (1991) have 
argued, the choice of subject matter cannot be neutral. 
Whose history and literature are taught and whose ignored? 
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Which groups are included and which groups are left out in 
the reading text? From whose point of view is the past and 
present examined? Which themes are emphasized and which are 
not? Is the curriculum balanced and multicultural; or 
traditionally Eurocentric? The rules of reciprocating are 
the key mechanisms for transformation or for empowering or 
disempowering students. How much open discussion is there 
in class? Is there mutual dialogue between teacher and 
students or the traditional method of transfer of 
information from teacher to students? What do teachers say 
about the subject matter? Do students feel free to disagree 
with the teacher? Do students act like involved 
participants or like alienated observers in the exchange of 
comments in the classroom? Are the students encouraged to 
think critically about the material? Do they work 
cooperatively? These are the silent points the educator has 
to research in his/her reciprocal methodological application, 
in multicultural education for it to be transformative. 
The ability to attend to these issues of inquiry will 
lead to empowerment through knowledge. It will enable 
students to think critically about issues they come in 
contact with in their quest for knowledge. 
Shor (1992) defined empowerment as: 
a critical-democratic pedagogy for self and social 
change. It is a student-centered program for 
multicultural democracy in school and society. It 
approaches individual growth as an active, cooperative, 
and social process, because the self and society create 
each other. Human beings do not invent themselves in a 
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vacuum, and society cannot be made unless people create 
it together (p. 15). 
Giroux (1988) described this as educating students "to fight 
for a quality of life in which all human beings benefit." 
He went on to say, "schools need to be defended, as an 
important public service that educates students to be 
critical citizens who can think, challenge, take risks, and 
believe that their actions will make a difference in the 
larger society" (p. 214) . 
McLaren (1989) viewed empowerment as 
the process through which students learn to critically 
appropriate knowledge existing outside their immediate 
experience in order to broaden their understanding of 
themselves, the world, and the possibilities for 
transforming the taken-for-granted assumptions about 
the way we live (p. 186). 
Banks (1991) defined empowerment in terms of transforming 
self and society. He wrote: 
A curriculum designed to empower students must be 
transformative in nature and help students to develop 
the knowledge, skills, and values needed to become 
social critics who can make reflective decisions and 
implement their decisions in effective personal, 
social, political and economic action (p. 131). 
The teacher, according to Shor (1992), facilitates this 
curriculum empowerment in a democratic manner with the 
participation of the students balancing the need for 
openness in the structure. The teacher brings lesson plans, 
learning methods, personal/cultural experience, mainstream 
academic knowledge, transformative knowledge and school 
knowledge to class but negotiates the curriculum with the 
students and begins with their language, themes, and 
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understandings. To be critical in such a democratic 
curriculum means to examine all subjects and the learning 
process with systematic depth; to connect student 
individuality to larger historical social issues, to 
encourage students to examine how their experience relates 
to academic knowledge, to power, and to inequality in 
society; and to approach received wisdom and the status quo 
with questions. 
Empowerment in Reciprocal Methodology 
The most important aspect of this empowerment in 
reciprocal teaching is participation. When one participates 
in a project, one exposes himself/herself to knowledge. 
Piaget (1979) relates action to knowing by concluding: 
knowledge is derived from action .... To know an object 
is to act upon it and to transform it .... To know is 
therefore to assimilate reality into structures of 
transformation and these are the structures that 
intelligence constructs as a direct extension of our 
actions (pp. 28-29). 
Participation in an issue makes us curious. As Dewey (1963) 
argued, participation in school and society is crucial to 
learning and to democracy: 
There is, I think, no point in the philosophy of 
progressive education which is sounder than its 
emphasis upon the importance of the participation of 
the learner in the formation of the purposes which 
direct his activities in the learning process, just as 
there is no defect in traditional education greater 
than its failure to secure the active cooperation of 
the pupil in construction of the purposes involved in 
his studying (p. 67). 
Dewey viewed participation as the point at which democracy 
and learning meet in the classroom. For him, participation 
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is the corridor by which students develop scientific method 
and democratic habits rather than becoming passive in 
learning. Participation for Dewey is democratic when 
students construct their own purposes and meaning. Dewey 
maintained that to be a thinking citizen in a democracy one 
had to take part in making meaning, articulating purposes, 
carrying out plans, and evaluating results. Dewey argued, 
that rote learning and skill drills in traditional 
classrooms bore students as well as inhibit their civic and 
emotional developments. Students learn to be passive. 
Bissex (1980), Smith (1983), and Wertsch (1985) all 
indicated that participation provides students with active 
experiences in class, through which they develop knowledge 
that is reflective understanding, not mere memorization. 
Participation directly enlightens students about their 
present and future. It encourages them to work towards 
their aspirations. A participatory pedagogy empowers 
students to see themselves as part of their learning 
process. From Dewey to Vygotsky to Piaget to Freire to 
Banks, educators have asserted that learning works best when 
it is an active, creative process. The National Institute 
of Education (1984) cited student involvement as the most 
important reform needed in undergraduate education. 
There is now a good deal of research evidence to 
suggest that the more time and effort students invest 
in the learning process and the more intensely they 
engage in their own education, the greater will be 
their growth and achievement, their satisfaction with 
their educational experiences, and their persistence in 
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college, and the more likely they are to continue their 
learning (p. 17). 
Participation in learning opens the possibility of 
transforming the students' power of thought. For Freire and 
Shor (1987), "transformation is possible because 
consciousness is not a mirror of reality, not a mere 
reflection, but is reflexive and reflective of reality" (p. 
13). Freire argued that when we participate in critical 
classes, we can go beyond merely repeating what we know or 
what we have been taught. We can reflect on reality and on 
our received values, words, and interpretations in ways that 
illuminate meanings we hadn't perceived before. The 
reflection can transform our thought and behavior, which in 
turn has the power to alter reality itself if enough people 
reconstruct their knowledge and take action. Freire (1987) 
explained the process: 
As conscious human beings, we can discover how we are 
conditioned by the dominant ideology. We can gain 
distance on our moment of existence .... We can 
struggle to become free precisely because we can know 
we are not free! That is why we can think of 
transformation (p. 13). 
People can overcome limitations if they have the courage to 
examine those possibilities or problems they encounter. 
Problem Posing in Reciprocal Teaching Method 
This is another method of engaging students in critical 
and mutual learning. This method is rooted in the work of 
Dewey and Piaget who view it as a means by which students 
develop a critical scientific mind. Many academicians 
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support this dynamic approach, including Freire, who evolved 
from it his concept of "problem-posing dialogue". In 
Freire's method the facilitator is seen as the problem-poser 
who activates a critical dialogue in class. Problem-posing 
as a pedagogy and social philosophy focuses on power 
relations in the classroom, in the institution and in 
society at large. It considers the social, economic, and 
cultural contexts of education which affect their learning 
process. 
Freire (1970) brilliantly used his outstanding metaphor 
of "banking education" to contrast the politics of 
traditional methods with problem-posing. He viewed banking 
educators as educators who view students' minds as tabula 
rasa accounts where information is deposited through 
didactic lectures. He sees the material to be deposited 
coming from what he called the "Central Bank of Knowledge". 
The central bank according to Freire is the store of 
cultural capital which controls the standardized curriculum 
in schools and colleges. It reflects the status quo as 
academic standards. A good example of a central bank of 
knowledge is Takaki's (1993) reference to Bloom's (1987) 
definition of education and what an educated person should 
know about the world and America in particular. Bloom 
(1987) in The Closing of the American Mind argued that 
entering students are "uncivilized", and faculty have the 
responsibility to "civilize" them. As an educator he claims 
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to know what their "hungers" are and "what they can digest". 
Noting the "large black presence" at major universities, he 
regrets the "one failure" in race relations that black 
students have proved to be "indigestible". They do not 
"melt as have all other groups". The problem according to 
Bloom is that "blacks have become blacks"; they have become 
"ethnic". This separatism according to Bloom has been 
reinforced by an academic permissiveness that has soiled the 
curriculum with "Black studies" along with "Learn Another 
Culture". The only solution, Bloom insists, is "the good 
old Great Books approach" (pp. 19, 91-93, 340-41, 344). 
Bloom advocates a Eurocentric canon of information, as a 
means of transferring ideology to students. 
Bloom (1987) and Ravitch, Finn and Hirsch (1987), all 
traditionalists, view knowledge as universal and neutral. 
For them there are no historical choices as to whose culture 
is privileged in society. Rather the central bank is 
delivered to students as a common culture belonging to 
everyone, even though not everyone has the right to 
contribute to it, take from it, critique it, or become part 
of it. In their mind, the central bank is standard 
curriculum for students to model. But in reality the 
central bank is devoid of some students' culture and 
language and represents these knowledge bases as deficient. 
The transfer of this knowledge to students is thus a · 
maintenance of the status quo of the dominant culture and 
ignores the contributions of varied cultures. 
In contrast, the problem-posing method views all 
subject matter as historical products open to question. 
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From this perspective, a central bank is viewed as 
exclusionary rather than inclusive. From the critical point 
of view, the existing canon of knowledge and method does not 
represent a common culture. It is devoid of multicultural 
themes, idioms, minorities and working people which exists 
in any "common" culture. The role of the problem-posing 
teacher is to diversify subject matter and to use students' 
thought and speech as the base for developing critical 
understanding of diverse personal experience in both society 
and the existing knowledge. 
Before Freire suggested the banking metaphor and 
proposed the problem-posing method, Dewey (1966) offered the 
metaphor of "pouring in" to criticize the practice of 
filling students with information and skills. Dewey 
questioned why is it that "pouring in" is still invoked in 
school when it is universally rejected? The reason Dewey 
gave is that the schools lack the means for experiential 
interactive education. He also pointed out that there is 
political opposition to student participation because it 
challenges power relations in school and society. 
Freire (1970) shared both Dewey's critique of passive 
lecturing and his insistence that learning required 
participation and inquiry. He promoted Dewey's critique of 
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schooling by emphasizing how the banking or pouring-in 
method is authoritarian politics. Freire wrote: 
Whereas the banking method directly or indirectly 
reinforces men's fatalistic perception of their 
situation, the problem-posing method presents this very 
situation to them as a problem. As the situation 
becomes the object of their cognition, the naive or 
magical perception which produced their fatalism gives 
way to perception which is able to perceive itself even 
as it perceives reality, and can thus be critically 
objective about that reality (p. 66). 
The banking model is viewed as antidemocratic because it 
does not give the student the opportunity to make a critique 
of the information given. It denies the students' 
indigenous culture and their potential for critical thought. 
Instead, students are subjected to the knowledge, values and 
language of the status quo. 
Freire's problem-posing method views human beings, 
knowledge, and society as unfinished products in history, 
where various forces are still contesting each other. 
Freire (1970) emphasized problem-posing as a democratic way 
for students to engage in the contention over knowledge and 
in shaping society. He wrote 
Problem-posing education affirms men and women as 
beings in the process of becoming as unfinished, 
uncompleted beings in and with a likewise unfinished 
reality .... The banking method emphasizes permanence 
and becomes reactionary; problem-posing education-which 
accepts neither a "well-behaved" present nor a 
predetermined future-roots itself in the dynamic 
present and becomes revolutionary .... Whereas the 
banking method directly or indirectly reinforces men's 
fatalistic perception of their situation, the problem-
posing method presents this very situation to them as a 
problem (pp. 65-66). 
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This does not mean that the student has nothing to 
assimilate from Chemistry, Math or English as directly 
taught. Nor does it mean that the expertise of the teacher 
has no place in the classroom. All bodies of knowledge 
belong in the critical classroom, concludes Shor (1992) : 
As long as existing knowledge is not presented as facts 
and doctrines to be absorbed without question, as long 
as the existing bodies of knowledge are critiqued and 
balanced from a multicultural perspective, and as long 
as the students' own themes and idioms are valued along 
with standard usage, existing canons are part of 
critical education (p. 35). 
Problem-posing students do not reinvent Chemistry, Math or 
English each time they study them, but they do study 
Chemistry, Math and English in a critical context with a 
teacher who is open to transformative thinking in his/her 
outlook and who is also open to multicultural curriculum. 
Multiculturalism and Problem-Posing 
Teaching multiculturally requires the incorporation of 
cultural diversity throughout the total learning process. 
To incorporate student speech, community life, and 
perceptions critically requires problem-posing as well as 
multiculturalism. The students' speech, community life, and 
perceptions should be the foundations of the curriculum. 
Problem-posing can best develop from the students' cultural 
diversity within the classroom discourse. 
Freire (1987) in his literacy program in Northeast 
Brazil in the SO's and 60's, developed curricula from· 
student culture by researching local issues and language in 
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the students' communities. From the many linguistic and 
sociological items researched in students' neighborhoods, 
the researchers selected some key concerns that Freire 
called generative themes expressed through single generative 
words. They are called generative words because they are 
generated from student culture. They are also generative 
because they are provocative themes discovered as unresolved 
social problems in the community, useful for generating 
discussion in class on the relation of personal life to 
larger issues. They are the key words for critical analyses 
about self and society. 
By advocating critical inquiry in student culture, the 
generative-theme approach also reflects Deweyan progressive 
education. Dewey (1963) encouraged teachers to begin 
instruction with materials known to students and to 
gradually structure in conceptual understanding. He wrote: 
The educator cannot start with knowledge already 
organized and proceed to ladle it out in doses. 
Anything which can be called a study, whether 
arithmetic, history, geography, or one of the natural 
sciences, must be derived from materials which at the 
outset fall within the scope of ordinary life 
experience. When education is based in theory and 
practice upon experience, it goes without saying that 
the organized subject-matter of the adult and the 
specialist cannot provide the starting point. 
Nevertheless, it represents the goal toward which 
education should continuously move (pp. 82-83). 
It makes sense to say that when problem-posing places itself 
into the students' culture through their language and 
perceptions, there is more awareness and the students· become 
more interested in their studies. The students are now 
exposed to issues in their various experiences which they 
can begin to examine critically. 
Incorporating Student Voice 
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Shor (1992) and Freire (1987) point out that students 
must be encouraged to speak from their own experience using 
their own generative words. Teaching that incorporates the 
student voice allows students to make sense of the subject 
matter within their own realities. When we listen to 
student voices we are able to know students' prior knowledge 
of the subject matter, including any misinformation or the 
lack of information that should suggest future instructional 
strategies. Teaching should start from the students' life 
experiences, not the experiences of the teacher, nor the 
experiences necessary to fit into the dominant school 
culture. O'Connor (1988) made a similar point by stating 
that teaching multiculturally requires educators to 
recognize the conflict between the voice of the school and 
the voices of many students. Success in school should not 
be dependent on the adoption of the school's voice. He 
wrote: "The organization of school discourse, in a way that 
permits all cultural voices to search for skills and 
concepts to reconstruct their cultural principles in their 
own terms, must come to serve as the basic formula for equal 
educational opportunity" (p. 20). 
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Dialogic Inquiry 
Lather (1991) argued that teachers need to position 
themselves "as less master of truth and justice and more as 
creators of a space where those directly involved can act 
and speak on their behalf" (p. 137). Shor (1992) and Freire 
(1987) indicated that one approach is the use of dialogic 
inquiry in which instruction occurs as a dialogue between 
teacher and students. It requires that teachers have a 
thorough knowledge of the subject being taught. They 
emphasized the need for teachers to listen to students and 
dialogue with them rather than depending on a textbook and 
lecture format. Dialogical inquiry incorporates content 
about the students' backgrounds as well as that of the 
dominant society. It requires discarding the traditional 
authoritarian classroom to establish a democratic one in 
which both teacher and students are active participants. 
However introducing student voices to the instructional 
process is not easy especially when the teacher and students 
are from different cultural backgrounds. As Burbules and 
Rice (1991) argued: 
Prior experiences may have created feelings of 
intimidation, resentment, and hurt; an imposition of 
silence, or the self-imposed habit of silence, may be 
ingrained in some of the participants. Conversely, 
prior experiences may also have created feelings of 
superiority and a tendency to silence others (p. 410). 
They also point out that the teacher may face both anger and 
silence, which will only be overcome over time with dialogue 
that develops tolerance, patience, and a willingness to 
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listen. In as much as this methodology increases the 
participation of students in the learning process, it is 
good to know that some teachers are not comfortable with 
handling the issues that are likely to be raised. 
The question is what should the teacher's role be when 
students express biased beliefs about other groups? In as 
much as the students have the right to hold biased beliefs, 
they must be challenged as well. Freire (1987) argued: 
The educator has the right to disagree. It is 
precisely because the teacher is in disagreement with 
the young racist men or women that the educator 
challenges them. This is the question. Because I am a 
teacher, I am not obliged to give the illusion that I 
am in agreement with the students .... In the 
liberating perspective, the teacher has the right but 
also the duty to challenge the status quo, especially 
in the questions of domination by sex, race, or class. 
What the dialogical educator does not have is the right 
to impose on the other his or her position. But the 
liberating teacher can never stay silent on social 
questions, can never wash his or her hands of them (p. 
144) . 
Simon (1989) in confirmation on what Shor and Freire 
(1987) said, points out that the critical dialogue developed 
through these approaches enables students to understand the 
perspectives brought to the classroom by others from 
different cultural backgrounds. Students can easily relate 
the subject matter to their real world views and perhaps 
take an interest in studying and learning it. He went on to 
say that it also will "help students to begin to consider 
how they are both created and limited by their particular 
life circumstances and to consider alternative ways of· 
working and living could be supported by other possible ways 
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of defining one's work in the world" (p. 144). 
Promoting Critical Thinking 
Problem-posing promotes critical thinking pedagogy. It 
advocates curriculum in issues and language from everyday 
life. The primary component of the subject matter is 
generative themes that are the outcome of student culture. 
These themes generate critical discussions that are 
problematic to students' daily life. Cox (1990) in 
reference to Freire said that generative themes are 
students' experiences "weighted with emotion and meaning, 
expressing the anxieties, fears, demands, and dreams of the 
group" (p. 78). In effect, generative issues are found in 
the unsettled issues in personal life and society. The 
students' problem-posing will be derived from such 
experiences as voting, working, housing, community life and 
education. Developing the skills to think critically about 
these issues helps students make sense of the events and 
conditions that affect their own lives. Giroux (1991) in 
affirmation of earlier contributors on this issue held that 
when students develop the ability or the methodology to look 
at issues critically, he/she will be in a position to 
challenge and transform existing social and political 
issues. He wrote: 
To develop the critical capacity to challenge and 
transform existing social and political forms, rather 
than simply adapt to them. It also means providing 
students with the skills they will need to locate 
themselves in history, find their own voices, provide 
the convictions and compassion necessary for exercising 
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civic courage, taking risks, and furthering the habits, 
customs, and social relations that are essential to 
democratic public forms (p. 47). 
In supporting Giroux' views, the road to intellectual 
empowerment in the classroom requires patience, 
experimentation, negotiation, and careful observation of 
student learning. Students must be encouraged to involve 
themselves in hard work and to take responsibility for their 
education and for their role as citizens. In effect 
participation is very essential in learning. Participatory 
problem-posing, according to Shor (1992), can transform 
remote academic knowledge into knowledge that is accessible 
to students. There are two ways for transformation to occur 
for subject matter and discourse. The first is that the 
subject matter which the leader or the facilitator 
introduces to the students for reflection must be in their 
own language and reflect their own culture. The second is 
that students must be challenged to go beyond their own 
experiences into a new territory not originated from their 
own backgrounds. This dual transformation of subject matter 
creates a democratic problem-posing for the students in 
going from a one-way system to a two way system. 
Apprenticeship 
At a given time in history, the experts in a society 
determine the nature of current understanding. For example, 
one who understood physics in Aristotle's time applied a 
different body of principles in a different way from one who 
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understood physics in a Newtonian age. The breakthroughs 
associated with relativity theory and quantum mechanics have 
brought about further alterations in the contemporary 
understanding of the physical world. While the notion of 
understanding has usually been applied to conceptual or 
theoretical realms, it also has its niche in areas like the 
arts, athletics, or entrepreneurship. Experts in those 
domains possess skills, intuitions, and conceptual 
frameworks that distinguish them sharply from the novice. 
Each domain or discipline features its own forms of 
understanding. By that I mean the method we use to 
understand physics is quite different from the way we 
understand poetry, painting, politics or psychology. In 
other words, generalizations about understanding are 
elusive, and those that can be made are necessarily 
expressed at a high level of abstraction. 
I am, in effect, advocating apprenticeship, another 
method that is transformative that can be applicable in 
multicultural education. Apprenticeship or what many 
educators call "guided participation" has the support of 
scholars such as Vygotsky, Leont'ev, Bruner, Piaget, Cole, 
and Rogoff. 
In my traditional society of Nigeria, education takes 
place within the family environment of young children. In 
such traditional environments, children follow in their 
parent' footsteps in trade. Sons carry on the same 
145 
vocational practices as their fathers, and daughters emulate 
the vocational practices of their mothers. As societies 
grow more complex, with valued skills attaining a high 
degree of complexity, it typically becomes impossible for 
the young to follow their parents' footsteps. With 
complexity, the institution of apprenticeship began to 
decline all over the world. 
However, the advantages of apprenticeships continue to 
be enormous. Apprenticeships provide information that is 
practical and demonstrable within the society. They 
encourage aspiring apprentices to work directly alongside 
accomplished professionals boosting their knowledge or 
practice. The young empower one another by problem-posing 
in their various trades and practices. Apprenticeships 
carry with them a continuity and context that can be invoked 
at the necessary moment rather than at some arbitrary 
location in a lecture, text, or syllabus. 
Apprenticeship is the means of instruction that 
succeeds most effectively when young people begin to learn. 
Some forms of instruction within apprenticeships are natural 
language, simple drawings and gestures. It is the first 
method of teaching at home and in formal schooling. Rogoff 
(1990) points out that it occurs through guided 
participation in social activity with companions who support 
and stretch children's understanding of and skill in using 
the tools of culture. Apprenticeships form the 
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sociocultural basis of human skills and activities, and 
include children's orientation to participate in and build 
on the activities around them. Rogoff (1990), in reference 
to Vygotsky wrote: 
Central to Vygotsky's theory is the idea that 
children's participation in cultural activities with 
the guidance of more skilled partners allows children 
to internalize the tools for thinking and for taking 
more mature approaches to problem that children have 
practiced in social context. Cultural inventions 
channel the skills of each generation, with individual 
development mediated by interaction with people who are 
more skilled in the use of culture's tools (p. 14). 
Why then is apprenticeship as an instructional method 
declining in some societies? One of the reasons is that 
many saw apprenticiships as a way of exploitation of the 
young. Sometimes apprentices were punished or deprived of 
compensation by their masters. Second, in highly 
industrialized societies manual skills and crafts are no 
longer the main educational goal. However, apprenticeship 
is still prevalent in many societies. It is still viewed as 
an ideal way of learning in many cultures where knowledge 
is difficult to reproduce and transmit except through 
apprenticeship. 
In conclusion, I would strongly advocate for the 
reciprocal method as the best way in making transformative 
knowledge multicultural. I am advocating for this concept 
because it embraces empowerment, participation, problem-
posing, dialogic inquiry, critical thinking and 
apprenticeship. Each of these concepts, as reflected in the 
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review of related literature, supports learning and makes it 
multicultural in nature. The knowledge emerging from this 
method reflects both the reality observed and the 
subjectivity of the knower. The student becomes not only 
aware of the knowledge he/she has but that this knowledge is 
located within his/her particular social, economic, and 
political context of his/her society. It is important to 
know that culture influences knowledge construction. Banks 
(1995) confirmed this view when he wrote: 
Cultural influences have set up the assumptions about 
the mind, the body, and the universe with which we 
begin; pose the questions we ask; influence the facts 
we seek; determine the interpretation we give these 
facts; and direct our reaction to these interpretations 
and conclusions (p. 23). 
The student exposed to the reciprocal method is able to 
interpret and evaluate the views of scholars and social 
scientists and how their reflections shape those cultures or 
communities they embraced. Participation in reciprocal 
teaching and learning opens our world views. It transforms 
our knowledge when we begin an inquiry into the pros and 
cons of the issues and events in our society and the world 
at large. 
CHAPTER VI 
IMPLICATIONS 
In this thesis I have focused on transformative 
academic knowledge and its teaching relationship to 
multicultural education. In doing that I have focused on 
three points: (1) Multicultural education, by reflecting 
diverse ways of knowing, leads to transformative knowledge; 
(2) Students must be taught through participation to be 
critical of their own way of knowing and to appreciate other 
ways of knowing; and (3) Transformative knowledge is 
essential for social action in a complex world. This 
transformative academic knowledge requires changes in the 
curriculum, the form it should take and how teachers might 
interact with it. Equipping students with the tools they 
need for lifelong learning requires making hard choices 
among topics as well as difficult decisions about which 
scientific forms or models to emphasize when a topic is 
taught. As Feynman (1995) points out, "Everything we know 
is only some kind of approximation, because we know that we. 
do not know all the laws as yet. Therefore, things must be 
learned only to be unlearned again or, more likely, to be 
corrected" (p. 4). So part of teaching transformative 
academic knowledge involves preparing students to ant~cipate 
148 
149 
better explanations and even to seek them out. 
Transformative knowledge involves changes in the total 
school environment in order to create multiculturalism that 
can be beneficial to all students irrespective of race, 
color or creed. When teaching is transformed, the content 
of the curriculum, pedagogy and the ways in which students 
learn are modified. An important goal of transformative 
knowledge in multicultural education is to help students to 
understand how knowledge is constructed; how to go from 
novice to expert in this domain; how to master the subject 
matter or the dilemma that is before them; and how to view 
their own past, present, and future critically. Banks 
(1993) points out that, "Students should be given 
opportunities to investigate and determine how cultural 
assumptions, frames of references, perspectives, and the 
biases within a discipline influence the ways the knowledge 
is constructed" (p. 11). The tool central to this 
technique, according to Bruner (1986), is to expose students 
to transformative knowledge that will help to create in the 
student "an appreciation of the fact that many worlds are 
possible, that meaning and reality are created and not 
discovered, that negotiation is the art of constructing new 
meanings by which individuals can regulate their relations 
with each other" (p. 149). Students also should be given 
opportunities to recreate reality and to reinvent their 
culture and identify ways in which the knowledge they 
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recreated and reinvented is influenced and limited by their 
personal assumptions, positions, and experiences. 
Banks (1995) concluded that transformative knowledge is 
a very powerful tool by which students can be active in 
personal and social life. He wrote: 
Transformative teaching and learning is characterized 
by a curriculum organized around powerful ideas, highly 
interactive teaching strategies, active student 
involvement, and activities that require students to 
participate in personal, social, and civic action to 
make their classrooms, schools, and communities more 
democratic and just (p. 22). 
Transformative teaching should help students to take real 
delight in taking risks and engaging in intellectual 
adventure without which there is no creativity. The more 
students are exposed to this learning process through which 
they become new intellectuals, the more they will perceive 
that the departure point for changing society is not 
inherently or exclusively in their vision of the future, nor 
in their understanding of history, but in the understanding 
of the society in which they live. Students who go about 
their lives assuming that their group's patterns of acting 
and thinking are not open to question, I would say, are 
living in a fool's paradise. Unless students can break with 
their everyday experiences in thought, they cannot see the 
extraordinary range of options for living and thinking. 
Options are essential to critical thinking because there is 
no direct route to the diversity of knowledge or social 
action. 
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The multicultural classroom is a forum of multiple 
voices and perspectives. The voices of the teacher, of the 
students, of the textbook and transformative curriculum are 
important components of classroom discourse. Teachers and 
students can share their cultural experiences and 
interpretations of events to help them to acquire the 
understandings and skills needed to function in the complex 
culturally diverse world we live in. Creating a sense of 
questioning, wonder, and awe in students should be our 
highest priority. I am concerned that the current 
preoccupation with traditional ways of teaching do not 
advance us very far towards achieving that goal. 
Several questions remain that I have not been able to 
answer and my attempts at answering them must be from my own 
perspective. My first concern is how do these ideas about 
meaning and forms of representation in transformative 
knowledge pertain to schools and to what we teach in 
multicultural education?. From my perspective I believe 
that if there are different ways to understand the world, 
and if there are different forms of knowledge that can make 
such understanding possible, then it stands to reason that 
any comprehensive effort to understand the processes and 
outcomes of schooling would profit from a multicultural 
rather than a monolithic approach to knowing. The question 
is how can such a multiculturalism be advanced? What would 
be the best method to go about it? 
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The next question focuses on the different forms of 
representation employed within the context of multicultural 
education. In human understanding, are there varieties of 
representation? What is distinctive about them? Let me 
suggest that meaning is multiple, and that various forms of 
representation provide the means through which multiple 
meaning is made. Let me suggest also that different forms 
of meaning are related to different forms of understanding 
and these various forms provide for social action in complex 
situations. If this supposition of multiple meaning is to 
be accepted, how would future research in multicultural 
education be affected? 
Finally, another critical question emerges, regarding 
how ideas and values relate to action? Humans in various 
cultures have the capacity to formulate different kinds of 
ideas and these ideas are related to the forms of 
representation used and the way in which those forms are 
developed in different cultures. Knowing, however, how such 
forms of ideas are secured and the kinds of meaning they 
make possible is a core theoretical as well as practical 
problem. What kind of research is required to identify the 
different ways in which students come to understand and act 
on their world? If our ideas become static models, if they 
are not applied creatively to reality, do we run the risk of 
regarding them as reality? Can any one set of ideas be 
considered as an absolute truth? Can our conception of 
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truth reflect what even a well developed science can 
provide? Are there forms of assessment and approaches to 
curriculum that would make it possible to know, in advance, 
the multiple possibilities that a truly multicultural 
approach to education would provide? What is the 
relationship between student knowledge and the forms of 
representation that they have access to? Can we translate 
what is specific and unique to forms other than those which 
we have available to us in our own culture? These are 
critical questions that must be addressed if multicultural 
education is to lead to transformative knowledge. 
Conclusion 
The primary aim of this dissertation is not only the 
advancement of research, but also reflects a concern that 
students from different cultures and backgrounds can learn 
from whatever knowledge they have as well as from the 
knowledge of others and to learn that any knowledge must 
always be open to question. We employ multicultural 
education in order to make our schools better places for all 
who share their lives there and also to enrich the knowledge 
bases from which the citizens of our diverse world can 
engage in complex social action. 
his dialogue with Freire (1992) : 
As Antonio postulated in 
"And thus basically your 
method is a sort of challenge to intellectuals and to 
reality to reformulate that method in order to translate its 
principles as the situation demands and thus be a response 
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to different concrete situations" (p. 30). Transformative 
knowledge enables the student to evaluate the knowledge 
produced and also to understand that the knowledge producer 
is located within a particular social, economic, and 
political context of society. It leads to various 
possibilities in academic inquiry. It exposes us to 
different rich cultures of the world and to different ways 
of knowing. It enables us to have a critical view of other 
cultures' fears and taboos as well as an awareness of the 
fears and taboos of our own culture. It inspires or 
empowers us to move from novice to experts in a complex 
academic adventure as Shor (1992) said: 
Empowering education is thus a road from where we are 
to where we need to be. It crosses terrains of doubt 
and time. One end of the road leads away from 
inequality and miseducation while the other lands us in 
a frontier of critical learning and democratic 
discourse. This is no easy road to travel. Any place 
truly different from the status quo is not close by or 
down a simple trail. But the need to go there is 
evident, given what we know about unequal conditions 
and the decay in social life, given the need to replace 
teacher-talk and student alienation with dialogue and 
critical inquiry. Fortunately, some valuable resources 
already exist to democratize school and society. That 
transformation is a journey of hope, humor, setbacks, 
breakthroughs, and creative life, on a long and winding 
road paved with dreams whose time is overdue (p. 263). 
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